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1 Introduction 
This paper will explore the political risk to oil operations in areas of internal armed conflict 
(hereafter referred to as ‘armed conflict’) and propose an approach for conducting an 
operational analysis of political risk in such areas. The exploration and analysis will be based 
on a case-study of Shell’s oil operations in the Niger-Delta. 
 
As oil reserves are becoming increasingly scarce in an international economy where demands 
are becoming ever higher, the companies responsible for extracting the oil are ever more 
forced into an environment of armed conflict. However, the way they understand this 
environment will essentially determine their ability to continue operations. 
 
Oil is used to make a range of different products, but the bulk is utilized to make motor-
gasoline and distillate fuels (diesel, heating oil etc.), which comprises about 26% and 27% of 
the global output (Downey, 2009: 143-163). Oil is considered the most viable source of 
energy available, and is fundamental to industrial production, transportation, heating, power 
generation, and military power. The global economy is completely dependent on petroleum 
and access to oil has subsequently become a matter of national security for the industrialized 
world (Shelley, 2005: 1-2).  
 
The oil industry is a multibillion dollar industry, made up of three general sectors. The 
‘upstream’ or exploration and production (E&P) sector involves finding and extracting crude 
oil. The ‘midstream’ sector involves storing and transporting oil. Finally, the ‘downstream’ 
sector involves refining oil into the finished product, which is then distributed and retailed 
(Downey, 2009: 62, 74). Within the oil industry, the E&P sector is by far the most profitable, 
with Shell achieving a return on investments of 28% and Exxon 26.8% in 2002 (Shelly, 2005: 
18). However, it is also the sector most exposed to political risk (Downey, 2009: 83). 
 
E&P companies naturally must operate where reserves are found, which are often in 
politically unstable countries (Bray, 2003: 289; Jakobsen, 2007: 109). According to Ross 
(2008: 2) there has been a general decline in civil wars and internal armed conflicts in the last 
two decades, however an increasing part of these take place in oil producing countries. This 
trend is likely to continue as increasing oil prices push more developing countries into oil 
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production. Nevertheless, by going into areas where conflict is inherent, less risk-averse E&P 
companies consider it an opportunity to get ahead of competition (Bray, 2003: 289). 
 
Operating in such environments necessitates effective tools for understanding the risk; 
however the political risk literature is characterized by an overemphasis on general country 
risk combined with an inability to recognize the importance of risk specific to the particular 
company, industry or operation (Frynas and Mellahi, 2003: 541-542). This study will 
therefore explore how we can best analyse political risk to E&P operations in areas of armed 
conflict. In this effort we will conduct a single case-study constructing a political risk analysis 
of Shell’s E&P operations in the Niger-Delta.  
 
The study will first explore how political risk can be analysed. This involves explaining the 
concept ‘political risk’, examining how it can be analysed, and exploring the methods of 
analysis. By constructing a causal model of political risk to E&P operations, we will identify 
the variables involved with political risk and make it operational through a ‘step-based’ 
political risk analysis method. 
 
Using the step-based method we found that providing an initial ‘self-analysis’ made the 
political risk analysis optimal for analyzing risk specific to a particular industry (such as the 
E&P sector), and gave the necessary parameters for identifying the particular risks. Then by 
identifying these risks, our analysis was provided with a clearly defined dependent variable 
which enabled examination of the other variables involved. This allowed us to identify the 
actors that generate risk and provided our analysis with a fundamental intervening variable 
linking the cause to the effect. 
 
When analyzing the causes of risk we attempted to assign explanation to the choices of the 
actors and the structural environment in which they operate. Then by including risk 
management strategies, the analysis was provided with an exogenous variable of how risk-
affected companies can influence the political risk they are exposed to. Finally, on the basis of 
the analysis we will develope causal sequences of how risk materializes, before constructing 
indicators that provide us with data on the exposure to risk. On this basis we will be able to 
conduct a forecast on future risks. 
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By being very visible, having thousands of personnel and extensive infrastructure Shell is 
particularly exposed to risk in the Niger-Delta. Operating in this environment it has been 
faced with a range of conflict risks generated by several armed (and unarmed) groups. The 
causes of risk are largely linked to the tactics and strategies these actors use, by targeting 
energy-infrastructure and personnel. Their objectives are formed by the social and economic 
structures they are operating within, where the massive Nigerian oil industry has produced 
rent-seeking incentives. Shell initially attempted to manage these risks by relying exclusively 
on government and community protection, but as such strategies tended to be 
counterproductive they have increasingly aimed at engaging stakeholders more fruitfully. 
 
Our political risk analysis found that that government elections, oil prices, and ethnic 
patronage provide us with the most appropriate indicators for monitoring the exposure to 
these risks Shell has experienced in the Niger-Delta. We forecasted that the conflict risk to 
Shell’s E&P operations in the Niger-Delta will largely be limited to high-levels of oil-theft 
and piracy, until the years 2014/2015 when there is an increased risk of attacks on 
infrastructure, armed conflict etc. 
1.1 Study Outline 
In this chapter we will construct a research question and explain the approach we will apply to 
attempt to answer it. The objective of this study is to analyse the political risk to E&P 
operations in areas of armed conflict. In serving this purpose we present the following 
research question: 
 
 “How can we best analyse political risk to E&P operations in areas of armed conflict?” 
 
In answering this, the study will take the form of a case-study. A ‘case-study’ is an intensive 
study of a single unit to (at least partly) explicate on a larger class of similar units. It may be 
qualitative or quantitative (or a combination) in method (Gerring, 2007: 10-11, 20). 
According to Gerring (2007: 19) a ‘case’ is a “spatial delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed 
at a single point of time or over some period of time.” This study will use Shell’s E&P 
operations in the Niger-Delta as case to explicate on the political risk to E&P operations in 
areas of armed conflict. 
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However, there are certain trade-offs to exploring many variables on one unit of analysis 
rather than a few variables on many units. As the sample is so small but under intense 
scrutiny, case-studies should be employed to generate rather than test hypotheses; to give 
insight into causal mechanisms rather than magnitude of effects; to offer in-depth rather than 
general inferences; and to prioritizes ‘internal’ (certainty of hypothesis) over ‘external’ 
validity (generalizability of hypothesis) (Gerring, 2007: 37-44). The consequence is a study 
that may offer a well-scrutinized analysis of that particular case (i.e. risk to Shell’s E&P 
operations in the Niger-Delta), but is less able to draw general and scientifically sound 
inferences on a larger class of units (i.e. political risk to E&P operations in areas of armed 
conflict).  
 
In order to strengthen our analysis and make the inferences more generalizable, our study will 
base large parts of the analytical premises on statistical data. First, data on political risk will 
largely be based on Jakobsen’s (2007: 12) study of 322 reported incidents of political risk. 
Second, data on risk to E&P operations in areas of conflict will largely be based on Lia and 
Kjøk’s (2004: 103) study of 262 incidents of ‘petroleum terrorism’ between 1968 and 1999 
across 62 countries. Finally, data on incidents of armed conflict in the Niger-Delta will largely 
be based on the Global Terrorism Database (START, 2011) of over 98,000 terrorist attacks 
between 1970 and 2010, off course limited to incidents in Nigeria by armed groups operating 
in the Niger-Delta. Although, this accounts only for 78 incidents, it seems relatively 
representative when compared to the qualitative data. 
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2 Analyzing Political Risk 
In this chapter we will explain the concept of political risk and how to analyse it. The scale of 
investment needed in the oil industry is immense, particularly in the E&P sector (Shelly, 
2005: 15-16). When a company builds or purchases the necessary infrastructure in a foreign 
country, it ties its financial assets up in a ‘foreign direct investment’ (FDI) (Oatley, 2008: 
169). There are vast amounts of money at stake and the major oil companies are among the 
world’s largest multinational corporations. In 2003, BP had over 141 billion US$ tied up in 
FDI, followed by Exxon with over 116 billion US$, and Shell with over 112 billion US$ 
(Oatley, 2008: 171).  
 
As withdrawing would incur intolerable financial losses, once assets have been sunk into 
foreign ground they become ‘hostages’ to the political environment of the host country (Bray, 
2003: 292; Jakobsen, 2007: 23). Although domestic investments also involve political risk, 
FDI is considered much more risky as executives tend to be more familiar with domestic than 
foreign investments (Lax, 1983: 4-5). As plenty of time and money can be lost by ignoring or 
misinterpreting the risk associated with foreign socio-political environments, companies with 
FDI are in strong need of analyses on the political risk of the host-country (Brink, 2004: 7). 
 
Although there is a whole industry providing political risk analysis to corporations, the final 
product they deliver have often been criticized for being inherently subjective, theoretically 
and empirically uninformed, and for having questionable validity and accuracy. Many of the 
risk-ratings might in fact be counterproductive to their corporate customers. This is partly due 
to the complex and multifaceted nature of political risk, which has prevented political risk 
analysis from developing into a coherent discipline. (Jakobsen, 2007: 13-14). 
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2.1 Defining ‘Political Risk’ 
The study of political risk has been prevented from developing into an academic principle, 
largely due to the disparity between literary contributions to the subject, which even diverge 
on what the concept of ‘political risk’ involves (Jakobsen, 2007: 19). As Alon et al. (2006: 
624) states “If there is one agreement in the literature, it is that a consensus has not been 
reached regarding the definition of the term.” However, as a thorough specification of key 
concepts is fundamental to any analysis (Hellevik, 2002: 78), we attempt to find a suitable 
definition.  
 
‘Political risk’ partly overlaps with ‘strategic risk’ (regarding companies’ strategic decisions; 
Cortez, 2010: 64) and ‘operational risk’ (regarding companies’ internal operations; Cortez, 
2010: 69). As many variables are interrelated, it can also be difficult to distinguish from 
‘country risk’ (regarding the general risk in the host-country) (Jakobsen, 2007: 23). 
Nevertheless, ‘political risk’ focuses solely on the risk related to the political environment. 
Other types of risk may only be considered political risk if they stem from political actions or 
processes rather than from other dynamics (Lax, 1983: 9). 
 
Bremmer and Keat (2009: 5) define ‘political risk’ as “the probability that a particular 
political action will produce changes in economic outcomes.” They include risks such as 
global warming and demographic changes (Bremmer and Keat, 2009: 10). However, this 
necessitates an immense stretching of the concept of ‘political’. Jakobsen (2007: 24) therefore 
argues in favour of restricting political risks to encompass only those events that result from 
inherently socio-political circumstances.  
 
Brink (2004: 18) defines ‘political risk’ as “the probability that business will either earn less 
money, or suffer losses in profit as a result of stakeholders within a political system’s 
(in)actions or reactions to events, decisions and policies.” However, the definition is 
excessively restricted as political risk may stem from stakeholders both within and outside the 
political system (Bremmer and Keat, 2009: 9).  
 
7 
 
Furthermore, as these definitions define ‘political risk’ exclusively in terms of profitability, 
they overlook companies’ less tangible (but equally important) assets and the range of 
possible goals they may pursue (Lax, 1983: 9; McKellar, 2010: 4). Jakobsen (2007: 3-4) 
defines ‘political risk’ as “those events, actions, processes, or characteristics of a socio-
political nature that have the potential to - directly or indirectly - significantly and negatively 
affect the goals of foreign direct investors.” As it overcomes the preceding shortcomings, this 
study will apply Jakobsen’s definition of ‘political risk’. 
2.1.1 Macro-Risk vs. Micro-Risk 
Although political risk will largely be similar for all companies operating in the host-country, 
it will affect companies differently across different industries. Political risk can therefore be 
dichotomized into macro-risk and micro-risk (Alon et al, 2006: 625). Macro-risk is the 
political risk affecting all foreign companies across all industries in the host-country, whereas 
micro-risk is the political risk specific to a company, industry or project commonly involving 
their reciprocal effects (Alon and Herbert, 2009: 127-128).  
 
Although micro-risk generally predominates in a company’s operating environment, literature 
has tended to give macro-risk primary attention (Alon et al, 2006: 626). However, an 
excessive focus on macro-risk at the expense of micro-risk may obscure the analysis by 
providing superfluous information. In fact, political risk as a dependent variable should 
transmit only the essential contingencies (Frei and Ruloff, 1988: 4). Furthermore, as it is the 
company or project in question that is affected, political risk cannot be analysed separately 
from it. Subsequently, political risk should be analysed as ‘firm-specific’ (Frynas and 
Mellahi, 2003: 546) – in our case as ‘E&P-specific’. 
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2.2 Political Risk Analysis 
Political risk analysis (PRA) is employed as a decision-making tool that helps facilitate 
corporate planning (Lax, 1983: 12). PRA entails an attempt to envision how the company’s 
actions (or inactions) will affect future outcomes (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981: 12). It therefore 
involves analyzing the data in order to forecast on future risk and develop strategies to 
manage them (Howell, 2001: 5). As companies operate in a dynamic socio-political 
environment, often influenced by the company’s presence, the analytical process should be 
undertaken on a continual basis (Brink, 2004: 10). As a result, political risk should be 
identified, analysed, managed, and monitored for change, before the cycle is repeated (Cortez, 
2010: 50). 
2.2.1 The Causal Chain of Risk 
‘Risk’ can be defined as “potential harm, or hazard (McKellar, 2010: 3).” ‘Risk’ is the general 
potential harm involved with an activity (such as skydiving or investing in Somalia), whereas 
the singular noun ‘a risk’ refers to a specific potential harmful event (such as the parachute 
not opening or employees being kidnapped by Al-Shabaab) (McKellar, 2010: 4). ‘A political 
risk’ should therefore be understood as a consequent effect of certain socio-political causes 
(Lax, 1983: 10). This causal sequence can be described as a ‘causal chain’ of risk (Jakobsen, 
2007: 25-26). 
 
The effect (‘a risk’) is often referred to as a ‘political risk-event’, defined as “any outcome in 
the host-country which, if it occurs, would have a negative impact on the success of the 
venture (Bunn and Mustafaoglu, 1978: 1558).” However, in order to gain systematic 
understanding of the risk-event, one needs to evaluate its causes (Frynas and Mellahi, 2003: 
546). The cause of a risk-event is often referred to as a ‘political risk-factor’, defined as “any 
set of circumstances which influences the occurrence of a Political Risk Event (Bunn and 
Mustafaoglu, 1978: 1559).” In fact, a ‘cause’ is characterized as the circumstances which 
raise the probability of an event occurring (Gerring, 2005:169). Political risk-factors are 
therefore the circumstances which raise the probability of a political risk-event materializing. 
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A ‘risk indicator’ (or ‘Key Risk Indicator’) is a metric or proxy that provides data on the 
exposure to risk and the potential of future risk. The indicator is causally linked to the risk it 
represents (IOR, 2010: 1). It functions as an operational variable indicating the presence of a 
political risk-factor with the potential of causing a political risk-event to materialize. 
Indicators help distinguish significance from insignificance when analyzing the data (Brink, 
2004: 77-81; Lax, 1983: 126). 
2.2.2 Explaining the Causes 
PRA involves distinguishing the symptoms of risk (risk-events) from the causes (risk-factors) 
(Cortez, 2010: 140). However, the challenge is to decide on which variables and combinations 
that are likely to produce particular risk-events (Howell, 2001: 6). Such causal relationships 
consist of causal variables affecting a dependent variable, often through intervening variables. 
The hypothesized causal relationships can be explicated through a causal model (Hellevik, 
1988: 10-11). Such a model help organize variables and the relationships between them, as 
well as indicating the path of influence (Lax, 1983: 117). It will also provide direction to the 
collection of data (Brink, 2004: 36).  
 
In an effort to explicate the causal relationships involved, Jakobsen (2007: 25-27) presents a 
causal model of political risk (figure 1). In the model the dependent variable is represented by 
the political risk-event (effect), the causal variable is represented by the sources of political 
risk. The actors through which political risk is generated functions as an intervening variable. 
Integrated into the model as exogenous variables are the effect of the industry or operation 
(project-specific) and the risk management strategies employed (risk mitigation). 
 
Figure 1: Jakobsen’s causal model of political risk 
 
(Source: Jakobsen, 2007: 27) 
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PRA essentially involves generating hypothesis on how the causal relationships between the 
analytical variables produce risk. On the basis of the hypothesis we can develop a causal 
sequence of risk, construct indicators showing the presence of risk, and forecast on the 
plausibility the risk materializing (McKellar, 2010: 102-103). However, hypothesis is 
dependent on theory as “No causal argument of any sort… could be made without assuming a 
good deal about how the world works (Gerring, 2005: 179)”. Therefore, the key to PRA is to 
theoretically link the risk-events to the risk-factors and their indicators (Howell and Chaddick, 
1994: 73). 
2.2.3 Forecasting the Effects 
A risk-event describes a future contingency and is far from certain to emerge (Lax, 1983: 13). 
Therefore, risk involves potential rather than certain of emerging risk-events (McKellar, 
2010: 3). The existence of more than one potential outcome (may/may not occur) is known as 
uncertainty; risk can therefore be described as a state of uncertainty where some of the 
potential outcomes involve harm (Hubbard, 2007: 46). In fact, according to Kaplan and 
Garrick (1981: 12) risk is the very product of harm and uncertainty (risk = uncertainty + 
harm). 
 
Nevertheless, Hubbard (2007: 46) argues that uncertainty can become measurable by 
assigning a set of probabilities to a set of possible events. However, as odds are not 
mathematically defined, assigning probabilities to certain contingencies is not applicable to 
real-life events (Taleb, 2007: 127-128). Any probability estimate is therefore subject to the 
analyst’s perception of that reality. Two analysts could equally rationally and on the basis of 
the same data, assign completely different probabilities to the same outcome (Taleb, 2007: 
343-346). 
 
On the other hand, such subjective probabilities can be expressed through calibration (Kaplan 
and Garrick, 1981: 17-18). Calibrated estimates allow uncertainty to be expressed within the 
bounds of a probability-range. Instead of expressing a probability at 75%, it could be 
expressed as 60%-90%. Such a probability-range can be set at a standard 90% confidence-
interval allowing a 10% room for uncertainty (margin-of-error) (Hubbard, 2007: 53-55). 
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Furthermore, as the prospect of an event materializing exists independently of being 
recognized, it is also subject to the analyst’s perception. Subsequently, a risk-event may be 
possible regardless of whether or not it is considered a possibility (Holton, 2004: 22). Such 
unanticipated events are known as ‘Black Swans’, and are according to Taleb (2007: 149) 
impossible to forecast. However, unlike other types of risks, political risks are generated by 
more or less rational actors operating within certain constraints and driven by certain 
underlying incentives. Therefore, a political event does not emerge completely unanticipated 
(Bremmer and Keat, 2009: 21-22). 
2.3 Methods of Analysis 
Instead of leaving the analytical model as an abstract concept, it must be made operational 
through a method of political risk analysis. Although there is a range of different methods 
relevant to political risk analysis, a distinction can be made between quantitative and 
qualitative methods (Lax, 1983: 120-124). Quantitative methods are based on numerical 
measurements in order to attain scientific objectivity. It aims to generate general conclusions 
or test hypotheses (King et al., 1996: 3). Qualitative methods reconcile with an inability to 
attain objectivity and acknowledge the subjectivity within the method. However, it is 
ultimately the objective and purpose of the analysis that determines the choice of method 
(Devine, 2002: 205-207).  
2.3.1 Qualitative Political Risk Analysis Methods 
As an unstructured qualitative method, the political risk analysis is presented as a traditional 
report based on the conclusions of company managers’ meetings with host-country officials 
(‘grand tour’-method), or on the conclusions of country-experts with ‘insiders-contacts’ (‘old 
hands’-method) (Frei and Ruloff, 1988: 6; Mortanges and Allers, 1996: 306-307). However, 
as these methods lack any systematic form of evaluation and are based on the intuition of 
managers/experts, they tend to be selective, subjective, and biased (Frei and Ruloff, 1988: 6; 
Mortanges and Allers, 1996: 306-307). 
 
Among the structured qualitative methods are the ‘expert-generated’ PRA (Frei and Ruloff, 
1988: 6). In the ‘Delphi Technique’ a group of experts individually offer probability estimates 
on particular risks. After evaluating the other contribution the estimates are revised, before an 
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average estimate is finally presented (Mortanges and Allers, 1996: 307). In a ‘checklist’, risk-
factors are systematically reviewed before being combined into a single risk-score (Lax, 
1983: 127; Mortanges and Allers, 1996: 307). Nevertheless, ‘experts’ have a tendency to 
underestimate their own uncertainty, often making overambitious forecasts (Taleb, 2007: 146-
147). 
 
In ‘scenario-building’, risk-events are forecasted as logical outcomes of particular risk-factors 
(Brink, 2004: 49-50). In the ‘event-tree’ model possible risk-events are identified before 
backtracking to their risk-factors and probable causal patterns (Di Nicola and McCallister, 
2006: 182-183). However, as risk-factors are selected intuitively and not based on a 
theoretical model, causal-variables may be overlooked or overemphasized (Lax, 1983: 140). 
2.3.2 Quantitative Political Risk Analysis Methods 
Quantitative methods seek to measure probabilities of risk by quantifying risk-factors and 
indicators (Mortanges and Allers, 1996: 308). The general riskiness of the operating 
environment can be measured, by assigning numerically measurable indicators to risk-factors 
representing certain socio-political issues relating to the host-country or industry (Brink, 
2004: 81-83; Lax, 1983: 129). Each aggregate factor-score can be calculated into probabilities 
of risk or combined into country risk-rating (Brink, 2004: 118-119). Such ‘indicator-based’ 
methods can be ‘company-specific’ like Shell’s ASPRO-SPAIR (Mortanges and Allers, 1996: 
308), or ‘consultancy-specific’ like BERI, EIU, Euromoney, Moody’s etc (Brink, 2004: 57).  
 
Despite aspirations for objectivity, Lax (1983: 126-127) argues “The quantification of 
opinions can be no more objective than the opinions it represents.” Furthermore, Lax (1983: 
128 -129) argues that in ‘indicator-based’ PRA methods “The dependent variable is left 
unspecified, except as an undifferentiated notion of political risk”. Therefore quantitative 
methods are unable to relate risk-factors to the particular risk-events companies may be 
facing. Furthermore by making in-depth analysis, qualitative methods provide a higher degree 
of specificity (Frei and Ruloff, 1988: 6), making them better equipped to provide company-
specific/micro-risk political risk analyses. 
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2.3.3 The Step-Based Political Risk Analysis Methods  
In the ‘step-based’ method risk is analysed through steps; each step building on the preceding 
one. The number of steps varies, but these steps are normally included: The first step is a self-
analysis of what is at risk. On this basis, the potential risk-events can be identified as the 
second step. The third step involves qualitatively/quantitatively estimating their probabilities 
and the fourth estimating their impacts. The final step involves comparing and prioritizing the 
risk-events in terms of probability and impact. An estimation of uncertainty involved with the 
study may also be included (Di Nicola and McCallister, 2006: 183-184).  
 
Although ‘indicator-based’ methods may provide appropriate risk-rating for macro-risk, the 
‘step-based’ method provides a more applicable method for analyzing company-
specific/micro-risk. First, as the self-analysis provides certain parameters for which risk-
events are to be anticipated, the method allows a higher degree of specificity and objectivity. 
Second, identifying specific risk-events provides the analysis with a clearly defined dependent 
variable that allows analysis of the causal relationships between the variables. However, the 
step-based method as described above lacks a theoretical model. Unless causal relationships 
are theoretically acknowledged, certain risk-factors may be overlooked or overemphasized. 
McKellar (2010: 86-97) overcomes this in his method by adding a step for analyzing the 
choices of the risk-actors and the political environment in which they operate. 
2.4 Analyzing Political Risk E&P Operations in 
Areas of Armed Conflict 
Exploring how we can best analyse political risk to E&P operations in areas of armed conflict, 
we have found that we must hypothesise on how the causal relationships between the 
analytical variables produce risk. These causal relationships can be explicated through a 
causal model. In this effort we have constructed a causal model of political risk to E&P 
operations inspired by Jakobsen’s (2007: 25-27) framework. In our causal model of risk to 
E&P operations (figure 2) risk-events function as the dependent variable and are caused by 
risk-factors which functions as the causal variable. The causal effect is transmitted through 
risk-actors which functions as an intervening variable and is influenced by risk management 
as an exogenous variable. 
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Figure 2: Causal model of risk to E&P operations 
 
The next stage is making this causal model operational through a political risk analysis 
method. As we are concerned with political risk specific to E&P operations in areas of armed 
conflict (by focusing on Shell in the Niger-Delta) rather than a general risk-rating of a host-
country, our analysis is completely dependent on a high degree of operational specificity. 
Furthermore, as our case-study aims to draw more general inferences of the broader category 
of risk to E&P operations in areas of armed conflict, the analysis needs to meet certain 
standards of objectivity.  
 
The best suited method for our purpose is therefore the ‘step-based’ method. The first step 
will involve a self-analysis of the company’s assets exposed to risk. The second step will 
involve identifying the most relevant risk-events. The third step involves identifying the risk-
actors. The fourth step involves analyzing the risk factors. The fifth step involves analyzing 
the effect of risk management by the affected company. Finally, on the basis of the 
relationships between the variables in our analysis, we will develop causal sequences linking 
the particular risk-events to specific risk-actors and risk-factors, in addition to the risk 
management that has been utilized in response. Then we will construct risk indicators that 
offer data on the exposure to risk, before forecasting future risks by creating particular 
contingencies and assess their plausibility of materializing. 
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3 Risk-Exposures  
This chapter will provide the analysis with the parameters necessary for identifying the 
relevant risk-events to E&P operations in areas of armed conflict. To be able to identify and 
analyse political risk, it is fundamental to understand what is at risk. ‘Risk-exposures’ are the 
key assets exposed to harm by risk-events (McKellar, 2010: 77, 83). Any business sector will 
naturally have its own unique range of critical assets, but McKellar (2010: 56-57) defines 
three types of assets general to all sectors: reputation, personnel, and performance. 
 
The primary asset is the company’s performance. A company’s performance depends on 
continuity and control. ‘Control’ involves a company’s ability to retain tenure and influence 
over its operations. A company will often face attempts by actors seeking to force their will 
on the relevant operation. ‘Continuity’ refers to the company’s ability to preserve the agenda 
of their operations. Continuity of operations is susceptible to disruptions or even lasting 
cessations (McKellar, 2010: 62-64). 
 
The company’s personnel are a critical asset as they are the product of a great deal of training 
and investment. As the personnel are the ones operating the company, the company’s overall 
completely performance depend on them. Furthermore, a company’s legitimacy among 
stakeholders also largely depends on how they provide for their employees (McKellar, 2010: 
57-59). Naturally it is only personnel stationed in the host-country that are exposed to risk and 
the more personnel the higher the exposure. Expatriate personnel tend to be more exposed 
than local personnel (McKellar, 2010: 83). 
 
Another key asset is the company’s reputation. The reputation is the perceived character of 
the company in the opinion of stakeholders such as staff, shareholders, investors, partners, 
NGOs, the media and the societies in which the company operates. Reputation provides 
legitimacy and credibility, and can constitute a great source of influence when in search of 
support for operations (McKellar, 2010: 59). Harm to the reputation is usually a result of the 
conduct by the company, its employees, or other associates of the company (Cortez, 2010: 
64). 
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3.1 Risk-Exposures in the E&P Sector 
The performance of E&P operations is completely dependent on technical infrastructure and 
highly specialized personnel. At the exploration stage, geologists are needed to locate the 
reservoirs through seismic surveys. When drilling, there is a need for various types of 
engineers and a collection of specialists to operate the rigs. Oil wells need to be manned by 
skilled labour and supervised by engineers. Offshore oil extraction is dependent on platforms 
of different sizes and reaches and the specialized personnel to operate them (Downey, 2009: 
98-123).  
 
The extracted oil is received at well-heads and flow-stations before being transported through 
pipelines to delivery-points like mainland ‘hubs’ or marine terminals, from where it is 
transported to the place of refinement by ship, truck, rail, aircraft, or transnational pipelines 
(Downey, 2009: 242-272). Such physical assets like infrastructure and personnel can be 
incorporated under the term ‘energy-infrastructure’ (EI), defined as “offshore and onshore 
physical, technical, and human assets (e.g., refining stations, pipelines, tankers, energy sector 
employees, etc.) in the oil and gas sector (Giroux, 2010: 36).” 
 
The E&P sector also tends to be increasingly exposed to reputational risk, particularly in 
regards to corruption and human-rights abuses, due to their relationships with particular 
stakeholders. Developments in communication (Internet in particular) have made NGOs much 
more efficient in both detecting incriminating incidents involving companies, and be able to 
mobilize political and legal campaigns in response (Bray, 2003: 294-296).  
 
E&P companies are often dependent on financial institutions for finances and insurance for 
operations. Such financial institutions also affect investors/shareholders and play a quasi-
regulatory role in world oil markets (like NYMEX and ICE or financial derivatives like ‘Oil 
Futures’). Furthermore, companies depend on outsourcing services to subcontractors in 
upstream-support (Frynas, 2009: 49-57). Such financial institutions, and lesser so contractors, 
tend to be under heavy pressure from NGOs, and reputational harm can prevent a company 
from obtaining the necessary finances or services for their E&P operations (Shankleman, 
2006: 27).  
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3.2 Risk-Exposures to Shell’s Operations in the 
Niger-Delta 
Nigeria (map 1) is one of the world’s tenth largest oil producing countries and Africa’s largest 
in times of full production (Peel, 2009: 6). Nigeria produces 2.3 million barrels per day (bpd), 
most of which is high quality ‘Bonny Light’ or ‘Sweet Crude’. The main importer is the US, 
but Germany, France and Italy are also substantial buyers of Nigerian oil (Omeje, 2006a: 35). 
Nigeria’s 34 billion barrels of proven onshore and offshore reserves are largely situated in the 
Niger-Delta (Omeje, 2006a: 31). 
 
Map 1: Nigeria 
 
(Source: Iledare and Suberu, 2010: 7) 
 
The Niger-Delta (map 2) is about 112,000 square kilometres of wetland consisting of several 
ecological zones of sandy coastal ridge barriers, mangroves, permanent and seasonal 
freshwater swamp forests, and lowland rain forests (Shell, 2012b). The Niger-Delta consists 
of nine states: Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta, Edo, and Rivers, and from 2007 also 
included Abia, Imo, and Ondo (Ibaba, 2011a: 72-73). Rivers State contributes about 40% to 
Nigeria’s oil production and Bayelsa and Delta States contribute about 15% each (Stratfor, 
2009b). 
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Map 2: The Niger-Delta 
 
(Source: Francis et al., 2011: xvi) 
 
Shell has been exploring in Nigeria since 1903 and producing since 1957, making substantial 
discoveries throughout the 1960s (Omeje, 2006a: 73-74). Today Shell’s operations in Nigeria 
are carried out through four subsidiaries of which the Shell Petroleum Development Company 
(SPDC) is Nigeria’s largest E&P company. SPDC’s operate onshore and in shallow waters 
with operations stretching over 30,000 square kilometres. SPDC is operated by Shell but is a 
joint venture where the Nigerian government holds 55% through the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Company (NNPC), Shell holds 30%, Total holds 10% and Nigerian Agip holds 
5%. Shell operates offshore in deepwater through Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production 
Company Limited (SNEPCo) which is 100% Shell owned (Shell 2012a). 
 
SPDC had an average production of 974,000 bpd in 2011 and has a production capacity of 
one million bpd. SPDC’s infrastructure includes 6,000 kilometres of flow- and pipelines, 71 
operative oilfields, 1,000 operative oil wells, 87 flow-stations, 9 gas plants, and two large oil 
terminals at Forcados and Bonny (map 3). SNEPCo’s largest field is Bonga, producing more 
than 200,000 bpd of oil and 150 million standard cubic feet of gas per day (Shell, 2012a). 
SPDC and SNEPCo employ about 6,000 oil personnel, about 90% of them Nigerian (Shell, 
2012d). SPDC operates onshore in Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa Delta, Edo, Imo and Rivers 
States (Francis et al., 2011: 84).  
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Map 3: Shell’s oilfields and infrastructure in the Niger-Delta 
 
(Source: Global Oil Insight, May 2007) 
 
As Shell is responsible for producing almost half of Nigeria’s total oil production and is by far 
the biggest company operating in the Niger-Delta, it has a much higher public profile than any 
other company. Shell is such a big actor that the Niger-Delta is often referred to as the 
‘Republic of Shell’ (Peel, 2009:158-159). Shell’s reputational assets can be witnessed in its 
stakeholder reporting and corporate reputational emphasis. Shell has since 1997 annually 
reported to key stakeholders including local communities, NGOs, shareholders, investors, 
governments, employees, media, contractors, suppliers etc. They also regularly report to stock 
exchanges like ‘Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes’, the ’Carbon Disclosure Project’, 
FTSE4Good etc (Shell, 2010a: 36). 
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3.3 Risk-Exposures to E&P Operations in Areas of 
Armed Conflict 
Exploring how we can best analyse political risk to E&P operations in areas of armed conflict 
we have found that a self-analysis of the company’s assets at risk, not only allows us to make 
the political risk analysis more industry-specific, but also provides us with parameters 
necessary to identify relevant risk-events. This makes the analysis more objective than if we 
had identified the risk-events on an intuitive basis. 
 
Companies are exposed to risk through their key assets. Generally these are identified as 
reputation, personnel, and performance. However, as the E&P sector is extraordinary 
dependent on infrastructure, performance translates directly into energy-infrastructure, 
identifying key assets to E&P companies as reputation, personnel, and energy-infrastructure. 
 
In the Niger-Delta, Shell Nigeria (SPDC) is particularly exposed to risk as they operate with a 
high public profile, several thousand personnel, and a large quantity of energy-infrastructure 
like pipelines, flow-stations etc. On the basis of the parameters given, we will go on to 
identify what type of risk-events these assets are exposed to in areas of armed conflict. 
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4 Risk-Events 
This chapter provide our analysis with the classification of what types of risk-events E&P 
operations in areas of armed conflict are exposed, contributing with a dependent variable. It is 
essential for any political risk analysis to develop categories which include the types of 
possible risk-events a company might face in their business operations (Cortez, 2010: 51). 
Consequently, political risk has evolved into a concept with a range of sub-classifications 
(Alon et al, 2006: 624). 
 
In his study Jakobsen (2007: 89-91) classified 27 different types of risk-events into three 
exclusive categories: government interventions/regulations; acts relating to 
war/terrorism/social unrest; and other acts committed by non-governmental actors, like NGO 
activism, lawsuits related to political activism, disputes with other companies, and corruption 
(Jakobsen, 2007: 103-104). Government intervention made up 48% of the risks included in 
the study, whereas war and unrest made up 39%, and non-governmental actions 13% 
(Jakobsen, 2007: 97-105). The oil and gas industry made up 34% of the political risk-affected 
industries examined – by far the most risk affected industry in the study (Jakobsen, 2007: 
107-109).  
 
By statistically analyzing Jakobsen’s (2007: 206-214) dataset, we found that of the political 
risk faced by the oil and gas industry, ‘war and unrest’ constitutes the far largest category 
with 55.8% of the risk, followed by ‘government intervention’ with 34.5%, and ‘non-
governmental actions’ with only 9.7% (figure 3; see appendix).  
Figure 3.  
 
(Source: Jakobsen, 2007) 
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4.1 Conflict Risk to E&P Operations 
As the E&P sector is generally more exposed to war and unrest than other sectors in the oil 
industry (Bray, 2003: 293), this analysis will limit itself to the study of the category of 
political risk known as ‘conflict risk’. ‘Conflict-risk’ can be defined as “the risk that a 
project’s development, construction or operations may be adversely affected by the outbreak 
of violent conflict (Crossin and Banfield, 2006: 1)”. The concept to an extent overlaps with 
security risk (a subclass of operational risk), which concern itself with risks to a company’s 
premises, people and physical assets (Cortez, 2010: 70). 
 
Conflict risk-events may come in the form of “Demonstrations and blockades by local 
communities; sabotage of project installations or facilities; kidnapping or assault to staff; 
outbreak of violent clashes between armed groups; demanding of payments by armed groups 
to project sponsors…including reputational and even legal challenges arising from the 
proximity to these factors (Crossin and Banfield, 2006: 1).” 
 
Of the political risks related to war and unrest faced by all sectors, Jakobsen (2007: 102-103) 
identified five major risk-event categories which occurred disproportionately: the threat of 
war or severe instability and threat to physical safety made up 14.5% of the risk-events in his 
study; severe social unrest made up 8.4%; and protests/demonstrations/blockades against the 
company represented only 3.8%, whereas kidnapping or hostage-taking made up 32.1% of the 
risk-events and sabotage and terrorism/armed attack (massive bomb attacks, small-scale 
attacks on physical targets, and armed assaults on company employees) made up 41.2%.  
 
By statistically analyzing Jakobsen’s (2007: 206-214) dataset, we found that the conflict risks 
faced by the oil and gas industry (figure 4; see appendix), sabotage and terrorism/armed 
attacks made up 39.4% of the risk-events; the threat posed by armed conflict/severe instability 
and threat to physical safety made up 9.1%; kidnapping/hostage-taking made up 33.3%; 
military intervention (or threat of) by foreign state made up 3% of the risk-events; and 
protests/blockades against company made up 9.1%.  
 
For analytical purposes Jakobsen (2007: 90-91) has not included reputational harm and legal 
repercussions under the risk-event category ‘acts relating to war and unrest’, but in order to 
reflect the definition of conflict risk above, this study will include risk-events of reputational 
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and legal harm directly linked to armed conflict in the operating environment. The result is 
that NGO activism made up 3% of the risk-events and detrimental legal repercussions made 
up another 3%. 
 
Figure 4. 
 
(Source: Jakobsen, 2007) 
 
Lia and Kjøk’s (2004: 103-106) study of terrorism targeting the oil industry (figure 5) showed 
that blasting of oil pipelines was the most common type of attack of armed attack on energy-
infrastructure, and involved by far the most disruptions in the production process causing 
nearly 60% of all closedowns. Other types of sabotage against pipelines have been less 
common, but have also involved substantial disruptions and considerable economic losses. 
Such interruptions often lead to prolonged shut-downs, as production may depend on a single-
source pipeline and start-up procedures are complex (Adams, 2003: 102). Giroux (2010: 19) 
points out that a more recent form of sabotage involves ‘bunkering’, where oil is stolen by 
tapping it off pipelines. 
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Although confined to just a few countries (Yemen, Nigeria and Colombia in particular), the 
second largest category was kidnapping of oil personnel. Kidnappings tended not to result in 
casualties as captives were usually freed quickly and unharmed. In contrast, armed assaults 
on personnel often resulted in casualties. Although such attacks became increasingly more 
popular in the 1990s, they were still relative rare. However, in high-intensity armed conflicts 
armed assaults on personnel tended to be both more common and more lethal (Lia and Kjøk, 
2004: 106-107, 118-119). 
 
The third most frequent type of attack was armed attacks on company premises. The most 
common target was company offices, followed by oil-depots, refineries, and distribution-
centres. However, despite the potential for massive impact, such attacks have been much less 
common and caused less harm. The most common form of attack was through bombings, but 
armed seizures of energy-infrastructure were also recorded. Such armed seizures resulted in 
more substantial disruptions, with Nigeria, Yemen and Colombia again accounting for most 
of the incidents (Lia and Kjøk, 2004: 107-110). 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of energy-infrastructure targets of attack 
 
(Source: Lia and Kjøk, 2004: 104) 
 
Actors are becoming nautically more sophisticated, and the year 2007 witnessed an increase 
in attacks on offshore energy-infrastructure. Furthermore, as two-thirds of oil trade is 
transported by sea, tankers have increasingly been targeted for armed attacks and piracy 
(including petty theft, cargo-theft, kidnapping, holding ship at ransom etc.). Although only 
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comprising 3% of the world’s international fleet, oil vessels represented 30% of the total of 
piracy attacks in 2007 (Nincic, 2009a: 31, 37-41). 
 
Consideration should also be given to potential ‘Black Swans’. Although extremely difficult 
to conduct and highly improbable, a direct attack on an oil reservoir could cripple future 
production and in some cases significantly harm the producer-state’s entire economy. 
Nevertheless, such attacks could much more easily be conducted indirectly by massive attacks 
on wellheads and oil-platforms. The harm would depend on reservoir pressure as higher 
reservoir pressure would induce more severe harm (Adams, 2003: 102-103). 
 
On this basis we can construct a list of potential conflict risk-events to E&P operations: 
 
1. Targeting of energy-infrastructure (EI) (incl. kidnapping of oil personnel) 
2. Bunkering/kidnappings/piracy 
3. Armed conflict 
4. Protests/demonstrations/blockades 
5. Political and legal campaigning 
6. (Unforeseen events) 
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4.2 Conflict Risk-Events in the Niger-Delta 
Over the last decade SPDC’s operations in the Niger-Delta has faced the whole range of 
conflict risk-events identified above. SPDC and other oil companies were hardly exposed to 
any conflict-risks and security threats before the mid/late 1990s. With the increased conflict 
level, they were suddenly faced with risk-events such as kidnappings, attacks on energy-
infrastructure, seizures of facilities, and armed attacks. This caused a number of wells and 
flow-stations to be shut down, pushing production below normal capacity and increasing 
operational costs in regards to security and contingency budgets (Omeje, 2006a: 76-77).  
 
Threats of attacks on infrastructure in late 2004 helped push oil prices up to $50 bpd, forced 
SPDC to evacuate 235 personnel, and cut production by over 30,000 bpd (Nodland og 
Hjellestad, 2007: 11). Between May and July 2009 militants launched a campaign of attacks 
that shut down 124 oil fields in the Niger-Delta. Damage on SPDC wellheads and pipelines 
between Escarvos and Cawthorne channel in Delta State, inflicted a loss of $20 million per 
day in deferred production. By 2009 SPDC had completely shut down its operations in 
western Niger-Delta while eastern operations were barely producing 100,000 bpd (Courson, 
2011: 22). 
 
SPDC have also been increasingly faced with bunkering activities. In 2009/2010 there were 
reported 187 incidents of ‘bunkering’ of SPDC pipelines, in 2010/2011 there were reported 
237 such incidents (Shell, 2012b). SPDC is currently loosing an estimated 43,000 bpd to 
bunkering. Particularly to from the Nembe Creek Trunkline (NCTL) and Trans Niger Pipeline 
(TNP) in the Eastern Niger-Delta (Shell, 14/05/2012)  
 
Kidnappings of oil personnel have also been common, however rarely involving harm to the 
captives. In 2001, SPDC experienced 45 incidents of kidnappings of personnel; compared to 
24 in 2002 and 20 in 2003 (Omeje, 2006a: 76). In 2010, 26 SPDC personnel were kidnapped 
and one SPDC contractor was killed in an armed assault. In 2011, only 19 SPDC personnel 
were kidnapped (Shell, 2012b). 
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Between 2001 and 2008 Nigeria (tête-à-tête with Somalia) stood out as the most pirated 
country in Africa with 213 reported piracies. By 2007, Nigeria accounted for 29% of the 
recorded piracy attacks on oil vessels and in 2009 Shell’s oil tanker ‘Sichem Peace’ was 
pirated outside the coast of Nigeria (Nincic, 2009b: 3; 2009c). 
 
SPDC’s operations in the Niger-Delta have regularly also faced armed conflicts. In 2000, 
such conflicts caused SPDC a loss of 45 million barrels of oil, in 2001 a loss of 35 million 
barrels (Omeje, 2006a: 61), in 2002 a loss of 31 million barrels, and in 2003 inter-community 
armed conflict cost SPDC a loss of 45 million barrels of oil (Omeje, 2006a: 77). The inter-
ethnic armed conflict in Warri in 2003 resulted in the destruction of several SPDC flow-
stations (Francis et al., 2011: 26). 
 
SPDC has regularly faced protests, demonstrations, and blockades by local communities. In 
1998 local youths outside Warri launched a 24-day protest where they seized several SPDC 
oil facilities (Francis et al., 2011: 26). More recently, in April 2012 hundreds of protesters 
from the Nembe Island community blocked waterways in order to prevent SPDC oil 
personnel from reaching oil rigs (BBC, 2012b). 
 
SPDC has also has been faced with conflict-related political and legal campaigning in the 
Niger-Delta. In 2009, Shell paid $ 15,5 million in settlement under the US Alien Tort Statute 
for the complicity in the execution of Niger-Delta activist Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995 (Sherman, 
2012). 
4.3 Risk-Events to E&P Operations in Areas of 
Armed Conflict 
Exploring how we can best analyse political risk to E&P operations in areas of armed conflict 
we have found that classifying the relevant types of risk-events into sub-categories of political 
risk, provides our political risk analysis with a clearly defined dependent variable that allows 
us to analyse the causal relationships between the analytical variables. 
 
Although most companies in other sectors are particularly faced with political risk related to 
host-government intervention, E&P companies are particularly exposed to political risk 
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related to armed conflict. Having identified this as the sub-category known as conflict risk, we 
found that in the E&P sector this materializes in the form of risk-events such as armed attacks 
on infrastructure, kidnappings of personnel etc. Conflict risk also involves the secondary non-
violent risk-events related to the armed conflict, such as reputational and legal risk.  
 
The conflict risk-events to Shell’s E&P operations in the Niger-Delta have taken the form of 
attacks on infrastructure, kidnappings, bunkering, piracy, armed conflict between 
communities, blockades, and reputational and legal risks related to the government’s 
management of the armed conflict (specifically in terms of human-rights abuses). Basing the 
analysis on our causal model, the study will go on to identify what type of risk-actors that 
generate these types of risk-events. 
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5 Risk-Actors 
This chapter will provide our analysis with a classification of what types of risk-actors that 
generate risk to E&P operations in areas of armed conflict, contributing with a crucial 
intervening variable. Identifying risk-actors can be done, by distinguishing the actors with 
significant interest in and influence over the company’s operations. These fall into broad 
categories according to influence or activity in the operational environment. Delineating the 
categories can be done on the basis of past experiences in similar political environments 
(McKellar, 2010: 88-90). Of the political risks presented in his study, Jakobsen (2007: 106-
107) shows that the host-government generated 35.5%, militants generated 24.7%, local 
communities 15.4%, NGOs 12%, foreign states 10.5%, and regional/local government 6.3% 
etc. (the actors add up to more than 100%, as some risk was generated by several actors). 
 
In analyzing conflict risk, risk-actors are identified as the “individuals, groups or institutions 
who contribute to conflict; and/or are affected by conflict (in a positive or negative manner); 
and/or are engaged in dealing with conflict (Crossin and Banfield, 2006: 3).” By statistically 
analyzing Jakobsen’s (2007: 206-214) dataset, we found that the risk-actors generating 
conflict risk to the oil and gas industry, we can see that militants are behind 65.1% of the 
conflict risks, followed by local communities which generated 20.6%, criminals and labour 
unions/workers caused 3.2% each, and terrorists only 1.6%. Foreign states were the only 
registered states generating 6.3% of the conflict risks to the oil and gas industry (figure 6; see 
appendix). 
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Figure 6. 
 
(Source: Jakobsen, 2007) 
5.1 Conflict Risk-Actors of in the Niger-Delta 
Of the risk-actors generating conflict risk to the oil and gas industry, the four predominant 
types of in the Niger-Delta are NGOs/activists, local communities, militants, and criminals. 
 
NGOs/activists actors: Nearly all of the ethnic-groups in the Niger-Delta have formed ethnic 
advocacy groups to politically promote their collective interests. They agitate for 
ethnic/communal demands using non-violent methods like protests, petitions, seminars, 
conferences, position papers, attracting media attention, lobbying etc. However, some of these 
have militant arms (Francis et al., 2011: 123). 
 
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) is a Port-Harcourt based human-rights 
group that was established in 1990 and is lead by Ledum Mitee. They represent the Ogoni 
ethnic-group and operate mainly in Rivers State. They largely use peaceful means, but have 
also been known to resort to violence (Nodland and Hjellestad, 2007: 12). In 1993 MOSOP 
formed its militant youth wing the National Youth Council of Ogoni People, which would 
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attack energy-infrastructure, partake in inter-community armed conflict, and persecute 
dissidents within the Ogoni community (Omeje, 2006a: 142). 
 
Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) was established in 1998 by Oronto Douglas, Asume Osuoka, and 
Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari among others, and the current leader is Chris Ekiyor. The 
group advocates ethnic Ijaw interests through dialogue with the Nigerian government and 
private industries, as well as negotiating employment and security contracts for Ijaw youth. It 
had a military wing called the ‘Egbesu-Boys’ which is no longer active (Francis et al., 2011: 
124). 
 
Ijaw National Congress (INC) was established in 1991. INC promotes ethnic Ijaw interests, 
and conflict resolution and peace-building in the Niger-Delta. Their methods have largely 
been peaceful. Between 2000 and 2008 the president of INC was Professor Kimse Okoko 
(Ibaba, 2011a: 76-78). 
 
Local community actors: Nearly all local communities in the Niger-Delta have become 
militant (Allen, 2009: 43). Local communities will mobilize community-militias (‘vigilante 
groups’ or ‘vigilantes’) to promote and protect their interests. These will provide their local 
community with security, economic opportunities, and law and order. They operate very 
locally, but often in cooperation with police and will receive government support (Hazen and 
Horner, 2007: 73-75). 
 
The Bush-Boys is a community-militia organized to promote and protect the Okirika 
community (Rivers), mostly versus the Eleme community and other neighbouring 
communities. They do not independently tend to participate in criminal or anti-government 
activities. The group is lead by Sunny Opuembe. In 2004 they claimed to have 3,000 
combatants, but have since been reduced due to internal crisis and conflict with the 
NDVS/Icelanders. They have close ties to NDPVF and regularly collaborate with the 
Greenlanders (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 109-111). 
 
Militant actors: Ethnic-militias are armed groups which mobilize across the grassroots of 
their particular ethnic-group in order to promote and protect their socio-political interests. 
They largely adopt violent tactics like political protest, attacks on energy-infrastructure, 
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kidnappings, bunkering etc. They operate across their ethnic homelands, and are well trained, 
well organized, and armed with sophisticate weaponry (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 73-75). 
Ethnic-militias are financed through providing security contracts for public or private sector 
actors, political-enforcement, piracy, bunkering, kidnappings, and the sales of drugs and 
weapons (Francis et al., 2011: 128). 
 
Federated Niger-Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC) is an ethnic-militia largely representing 
the Ijaw ethnic-group in Warri, Delta State. They fight for Ijaw self-determination, but are 
also involved in bunkering. In 2005 the militia had a force of 3,000 militants. Oboko Bello is 
FNDIC’s president and spokesperson, and Chief Ekpemupolo (aka. Tompolo) is its military 
leader (Asuni, 2009a: 17). Other prominent members include George Timinimi, Kingsley 
Otuaro, and Dan Ekpebide (Ukiwo, 2007: 604). 
 
Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF or ‘Akuma Fiete’) is an ethnic-militia 
representing the Ijaw ethnic-group, but also draws support and members from other ethnic-
groups. NDPVF was established by Colombus Epibade and the current leader Dokubo-Asari 
in 2003. The group has its headquarters and is most active in Rivers State, but it also operates 
in Bayelsa and Delta States. NDPVF is loosely organized with sub-commanders in Delta and 
Bayelsa, and claims around 5.000 members. The organization has its political wing in the 
unregistered political party Niger Delta People’s Salvation Front. In 2007 a more militant 
faction called the ‘Reformed’/’Creeks’ NDPVF, splintered off from the core. NDPVF has 
collaborated with many other armed groups including Deebam, Greenlanders, and the Bush-
Boys (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 127-128). 
 
The Niger Delta Strike Force (NDSF) is a small multi-ethnic militia which splintered off from 
NDPVF. The militia was founded and is led by Farah Dagogo. NDSF is primarily active in 
Degema, Asari-Toru, and Akuku-Toru in Rivers. The militia only has about 60 members, but 
can mobilize about 600 when conducting operations with other armed groups under the NDSF 
banner. The militia often collaborates with MEND, Outlaws, and Deebam (Hazen and Horner, 
2007: 130-132). 
 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is due to its attacks on energy-
infrastructure and abductions of oil personnel the most visible armed group operating in the 
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Niger-Delta. MEND is primarily an ethnic-militia representing the Ijaw community, though it 
also includes non-Ijaw members. Its power base lies with the Ijaws in Rivers, Bayelsa, and 
Delta States. It operates mainly in Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta State (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 
123-124). MEND, together with NDPVF and ‘Martyrs Brigade’ sometimes conducts 
operations under the pseudonym of Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC) (Allen, 2009: 35).  
 
Criminal actors: Cults are groups of individuals dedicated to providing each other and their 
community with security and economic opportunities. Members subscribe to an oath of 
allegiance and secrecy, proscribing a lifetime membership. Cults are hierarchically organized 
and can consist of everything from 20 to 3,000 members. Some cults have no political 
objectives, while others are pro- or anti-government. Cults are involved in criminal activities 
like drug dealing and bunkering, political-enforcement, insurgent activities, providing security 
contracts etc (Osaghae et al., 2011: 21-22).  
 
Cults have their roots in university confraternities, like ‘Pyrates’, ‘Buccaneers’ (Sealords), 
‘Klansmen Konfraternity’ (KKK), and the ‘Supreme Vikings Confraternity’ (Vikings). Many 
in the Niger-Delta political elite are members of such cults. In particular are many politicians 
in Rivers and Bayelsa members of the Vikings. However, fighting between the Vikings and 
KKK led he confraternities to delegate the violence to lower-level street-wings (Asuni, 2009a: 
8-9). 
 
As a result of the conflict with Vikings, KKK formed Deebam in 1991. Although, Deebam 
claims to be fighting injustice and oppression, it has no political agenda and simply strives for 
control over territories. It operates primarily in Rivers, but also in Delta States. The cult 
claims to have 3,000 members in Tombia, 2,500 in Bukuma, and 6,000 in Port Harcourt. 
Deebam often collaborates with smaller cults, and has a strong alliance with NDPVF which 
supplies it with weapons. Deebam’s arch-enemy is NDVS and Dewell. It is not opposed to the 
state, but its rivalry with Deewell has led it to armed conflict with government forces (Hazen 
and Horner, 2007: 113-116).  
 
In response, the Vikings formed the ‘Icelanders’ which later changed its name to Niger Delta 
Vigilante Service (NDVS/NDV or ‘Germans’). The cult is lead by Ateke Tom from Okirika 
(Rivers). The leadership is all Ijaw, but ethnic Ikwerre, Ekpeye, and Ogoni are also prominent 
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members. The NDVS have between 6,000 and 10,000 members in Rivers and Bayelsa. It is 
organized in cells (‘suicide squads’) lead by senior officers (‘Germans’). It has little political 
agenda, but is a self-proclaimed government proxy with 90% of its members belonging to the 
ruling PDP political party. It traditionally has close ties to Vikings and Deewell (Hazen and 
Horner, 2007: 119-122).  
 
In Port-Harcourt, the Vikings also formed another street-wing in 1999 called Deewell. The 
cult has claimed to have 4,000 members operating primarily in Rivers and Bayelsa. It is less 
organized than other cults with no central leadership, but bosses (‘Scull executioners’) head 
the various cells and coordinate activities. A key cell is led by Gabriel Pidosom Jr. Deewell 
collaborates with Vikings, NDVS and Outlaws, and is in conflict with Deebam (Hazen and 
Horner, 2007: 117-118). 
 
The Outlaws splintered off from NDVS in 2004. The cult was founded by Ijaws, but also have 
members of Ogoni, Ibibo, and Ogba ethnicity. Outlaws are primarily active in Asari-Toru, 
Akuku-Toru and the area of Port Harcourt (Rivers), but have also been trying to establish 
cells in Delta and Bayelsa. They claim to have 4,000 members in Rivers. The Outlaws 
collaborates with MEND and Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta (COMA), but 
has enmities with NDVS (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 133-135). 
 
Figure 7: Configuration of armed groups in the Delta, 2007  
 
(Source: Hazen and Horner, 2007: 80) 
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5.2 Identifying Risk-Actors Generating Conflict Risk 
to E&P Operations 
Exploring how we can best analyse political risk to E&P operations in areas of armed conflict 
we found that by classifying the relevant types of risk-actor into categories we have provided 
our political risk analysis with an intervening variable crucial to understanding the causal 
relationship between the effect/dependent variable and the causal variables. Risk-actors 
therefore provided the link between risk-events and risk-factors, and  any analysis without this 
variable would be unable to link the specific risk-event to a particular risk-factor. 
 
In most other sectors companies are primarily faced with political risks generated by the host-
government, followed not far behind by militants, local communities, and NGOs. However, 
the vast majority of conflict risk in the oil industry was generated by militants. Although to a 
lesser extent, local communities also generated a substantial share of the risks, but other 
actors were behind far fewer political risks. 
 
We found that in the Niger-Delta there are four prominent types of risk-actors generating 
conflict risks. These were ethnic advocacy groups, ethnic-militias, local communities, and 
cults. Basing the analysis on our causal model, the study will go on to examine the risk-
factors causing the conflict risk to E&P operations. 
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6 Risk-Factors 
This chapter will provide our analysis with an exploration of the risk-factors that cause risk to 
E&P operations in areas of armed conflict, contributing with the causal variables. As we have 
seen, the analysis of causal variables of risk has to have some sort of theoretical foundation. 
Such theories tend to attribute causality either to the structural characteristics of the operating 
environment or to the choices of the risk-actors involved (Howell, 2001: 9).  
 
This reflects the ‘Structure vs. Agency’ debate in the social sciences, which is about whether 
socio-political outcomes derive from the actors involved or the context in which they operate. 
‘Agency’ theories (such as Rational-Choice) assign explanation to rational actions of 
individuals or groups of people involved in the socio-political process. ‘Structuralist’ theories 
however, assign explanation to the socio-political structures of human societies. These 
structures are not visible and exist only in the mental world, but essentially determine how we 
act as individuals and groups (McAnulla, 2002: 271-278).  
 
Despite their differences, there is little reason why such theories should not be combined in 
the same causal model (Howell, 2001: 9). This analysis will therefore examine both the 
choices of the risk-actors (risk-factor 1) and the structural characteristics of the operating 
environment (risk-factor 2). As the structural characteristics of the operating environment in 
the Niger-Delta (risk-factor 2) are extraordinarily complex and dynamic, a schematic 
presentation focusing on the headlines of theses characteristics would not do justice to the 
local dynamics. We have therefore chosen to offer quite a comprehensive and detailed 
description in order to provide a more complete depiction of the issues a political risk analysis 
would need to deal with in practice. 
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6.1 Risk-Factor 1: The Choices of Risk-Actors 
The conflict-risk to E&P operations can partly be explained by the strategic choices of the 
risk-actors. Tactically
1
, attacks on energy-infrastructure can be considered what John Robb 
(2007a: 94-95) calls ‘systems-disruptions’. Systems-disruptions are a form of sabotage on 
critical systems with the aim of inflicting economic harm. Systems-disruptions are easy and 
safe to conduct and allow militants to carry on in a sustainable way without losing men. They 
also tend to be cheap and will cause an economic impact many times over the insurgent’s 
initial investment. High-value targets (like oil refineries) may be difficult to attack directly, 
but by creating cascades they can be attacked indirectly (Robb, 2007a: 98-100). Kidnappings 
of oil personnel and other supporting ‘infrastructures’, can therefore also be considered 
systems-disruptions. 
 
Strategically, such attacks can be considered ‘fourth-generation warfare’ (4GW). Hammes 
(2006: 2) defines 4GW as a strategy that “uses all available networks – political, economic, 
social, and military – to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic 
goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.” 4GW aims not to win by 
military prowess on the battlefield, but by defeating the political will of the enemy. This is 
done by sending particular ‘messages’ through all available networks to decision-makers or 
those that can influence them. These ‘messages’ are tailored for the specific audience, but are 
fundamentally aimed at convincing decision-makers that their objectives are unachievable or 
too costly to attain (Hammes, 2006: 208-209). 
 
Operationally, actions are structured into campaigns aimed at defeating the enemy’s political 
will. This involves determining what ‘message’ to send, which network that would get the 
‘message’ across, what actions that will cause the network to send the ‘message’, and what 
indicates the ‘message’ is received (Hammes, 2006: 215-216). This can be done through non-
violent action like protests, media interviews, websites etc. or through ‘violent’ action like 
terrorist attacks or systems-disruptions – whatever gets the ‘message’ most efficiently across 
                                                 
1
 Hammes (2006: 215) distinguish between tactical, operational, and the strategic level. Whereas the strategic 
level involves a general plan to attain certain objectives, the operational level involves the campaigns designed to 
attain these objectives, and the tactical level involves the techniques and methods by which these objectives are 
practically put into action.  
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(Hammes, 2006: 219-220). Campaigns of systems-disruptions aimed at partially disrupting 
the critical systems are operationally more effective than completely disrupting them. Partial 
disruption causes more overall economic harm, delegitimize the government, and avoid 
pushing the government into a total war that would be detrimental to the insurgents (Robb, 
2005). 
 
A sustained campaign of partial systems-disruptions can have global implications. The 
market-price on oil seems less driven by supply/demand-mechanics of the NYMEX stock-
market than by speculators buying oil through off-exchange ‘over-the-counter’ (OTC) trading 
like ‘oil futures’. Systems-disruptions on energy-infrastructure has caused fears among 
speculators of diminishing supplies and tighter markets, consequently driving up the oil-price 
as much as 10%. This has added a ‘risk premium’ of between $4 and $25 per barrel on the 
price of oil. Events since 2003 indicate that insurgents are beginning to realize their global 
influence. However, it is not the few complete disruptions that causes fear among speculators, 
but the collective partial disruptions (Giroux and Hilpert, 2009).  
 
Robb (2007a: 116-127) explains that many modern insurgencies are organized in an ‘open-
source warfare’ (OSW). OSW is a decentralized and loose type of organization, like a 
‘Wikipedia of insurgency’, where any group willing is allowed to contribute and participate. 
Tactics and strategies are up for anyone to modify and improve through trial and error. By 
‘swarming’ on a single type of target (such as energy-infrastructure) militants indirectly 
transmit novel tactics and strategies to other militants, which will look for signs of success in 
the media, public space, and the security response it provokes. The struggle is organized like a 
‘bazaar of violence’, where favours and missions are outsourced. Although the insurgency 
lacks a central command, the OSW is extremely flexible, permits a high turnover of recruits, 
and allows innovation in tactics and strategy. 
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6.1.1 Systems-disruptions and 4GW 
Armed groups in the Niger-Delta have over the past few years conducted successful 
campaigns of systems-disruptions on energy-infrastructure (Osaghae et al., 2011: 21-22), that 
has frequently caused moves on oil markets such as ‘oil futures’ (Shelley, 2005: 69). This has 
largely taken the form of pipeline sabotage and kidnappings, but also attacks on offshore 
energy-infrastructure and piracy. Most armed groups in the Niger-Delta participate in such 
tactics with a varying degree of competence (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 116-134).  
 
Although MOSOP has largely adopted a peaceful approach, it can be perceived as utilizing a 
4GW strategy in its struggle. Basing their campaign on Saro-Wiwa’s understanding of the 
importance of global discourse and transnational networking, MOSOP framed their struggle 
in the context of the environmental degradation caused by SPDC and linked up with a 
massive network of international NGOs such as Greenpeace, Amnesty, and Friends of the 
Earth, as well as companies like the Body Shop. By linking SPDC with human rights abuses 
perpetrated by the Nigerian government, MOSOP managed to inflict the company with 
serious reputational harm (Soremkun, 2011: 107), and effectively and completely disrupt 
SPDC’s E&P operations in Ogoniland (Courson, 2011: 26). 
 
Learning from MOSOP’s success, FNDIC managed to combine military operations with 
media operations as part of a 4GW strategy. They were able to convey their message through 
their own newspapers and internet publication, tailoring their messages to different audiences 
to gain sympathy across the Nigerian and international community, and politically mobilize 
the Ijaw community (Ukiwo, 2007: 603-604). 
 
Until the emergence of MEND in 2006, NDPVF was the most visible armed group in the 
Niger-Delta conducting seizures of oil facilities, kidnappings, and assaults on security forces 
(Hazen and Horner, 2007: 127). Dokubo-Asari also soon discovered the value of attacking 
more vulnerable energy-infrastructure as a way of harming the national economy, rather than 
attacking military targets in its struggle against the Nigerian government (Courson, 2011: 29). 
When NDPVF in 2004 threatened to attack energy-infrastructure in an ‘Operation Locust 
Feast’, Shell evacuated 235 personnel which cut production by 30,000 bpd and pushed the oil 
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price to a record high of above $50 per barrel (Nodland and Hjellestad, 2007: 11; Omeje, 
2006a: 60). 
 
The Era of MEND 
 
MEND has since its inception in 2006 become the 
most important risk-actor operating in the Niger-Delta (graph 
1) with advanced capacity for systems-disruptions on energy-
infrastructure, and ability to structure attacks into 4GW 
campaigns aimed at changing the political will of the Nigerian 
government by effectively selecting energy-infrastructure 
targets has caused extensive harm to the Nigerian economy. 
They have adopted tactical ‘swarm-based manoeuvres’ by 
using light speedboats to quickly attack in succession and overwhelm any ability to protect 
infrastructure targets, showing an impressive ability of overpowering security forces (Robb, 
2007a: 82). 
 
Graph 1: Activity of MEND compared with other armed groups in the Niger-Delta 
 
(Source: START, 2011) 
 
Kidnapping oil personnel is at the centre of MEND’s tactics and they have largely targeted 
expatriates for their ability to draw media attention. In their first year of existence, MEND 
kidnapped about 128 expatriate oil personnel (Nodland and Hjellestad, 2007: 16). 
Kidnappings are not only meant to draw attention to their ‘message’, but also disrupt oil 
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production by creating cascades by forcing companies to withdraw personnel causing 
operational intermissions (Ibaba, 2011b: 26-27). MEND has so far released all hostages 
unharmed (Obi, 2010: 231), and its armed assaults have almost exclusively targeted military 
rather than oil personnel (Zelinka, 2008: 70). 
 
Systems-disruptions on energy-infrastructure are meant to force the Nigerian government and 
the oil companies to respond to their demands by disrupting oil production (Ibaba, 2011b: 27). 
Rather than targeting the military, attacks on energy-infrastructure harms the economy (graph 
2 and 3); as MEND commander Boyloaf explains “I believe the economy is the power…I 
don’t believe in fighting human beings, I believe in crumbling the economy (sited in Courson, 
2011: 30).” According to MEND spokesperson ‘Jomo Gbomo’, the logic “is to totally destroy 
the capacity of the Nigerian government to export oil.” MEND had within their first year 
managed to reduce the Nigerian oil production by 25% equivalent to $4,4 billion in oil 
revenues (Nodland and Hjellestad, 2007: 14). In 2007 the Managing Director of Shell Nigeria 
reported that MEND attacks caused losses to Shell of $61 million per day (Giroux, 2008: 17). 
 
Graph 2: MEND targeting                                   Graph 3: MEND targeting  
energy-infrastructure and personnel                    government/police/military 
    
(Source: START, 2011)                                    (Source: START, 2011) 
 
MEND also proved an ability to conduct attacks on offshore energy-infrastructure with the 
attack on Shell’s offshore Bonga platform (Giroux, 2010: 48) On July 12th 2009 MEND 
launched a daring attack on Atlas Cove Jetty near Lagos, an oil terminal of great economic 
importance to the Nigerian economy (Courson, 2011: 22). They have also conducted 
successful piracies offshore the Nigerian coast, such as the attack on MT Meredith carrying 
4,000 tons of diesel on January 21
st
 2009 (Nincic, 2009c). 
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By linking their attacks to specific political demands through public statements to the local 
and international media, MEND has successfully conveyed its message to the targeted 
audience (Nodland and Hjellestad, 2007: 14; Ukiwo, 2007: 607). Following an attack on a 
SPDC facility, where a pipeline was damaged and about 17 people were killed, MEND 
warned that “…the Nigerian government cannot protect your workers or assets. Leave our 
land while you can or die in it (Giroux, 2008: 15-16).” The fundamental message MEND is 
trying to convey to the oil companies is that “We alone, your hosts, can guarantee your 
security (Giroux, 2008:18).”  
 
Not only has MEND managed to dramatically affect the national oil production, systems-
disruptions in the Niger-Delta has also affected the international price of oil, something they 
seem fully aware of by stating that: “The fact that we have influenced the price of world oil, 
no matter how little, and caught the attention of the foreign media indicates we are on the 
right track.” In February 2006 a campaign of attacks cut production by 455,000 bpd – the 
result was a rise in the oil price of US $1.57 (2.6%) (Giroux and Hilpert, 2009).  
 
However, a radical faction within MEND has found systems-disruptions ineffective and in 
2007 Jomo Gbomo stated that “They [the faction] appear to be correct because the Nigerian 
government and oil companies are still not taking us seriously. We have the capacity to be as 
ruthless and callous as attacks witnessed in Iraq. We are capable of setting off as many car 
bombs as we wish and pack them full of shrapnel to maximize casualty. Our fighters can set 
rigs on fire with all the occupants onboard (Nodland and Hjellestad, 2007: 17).” This 
indicates a willingness to tactically target non-oil civilian targets, and can be witnessed by an 
incident in March 2010 when MEND detonated two car-bombs in Warri and another in 
October when it detonated a car bomb in Abuja (Ibaba, 2011b: 28). 
43 
 
6.1.2 Open-Source Warfare 
MEND is often perceived as an umbrella organization for several of the Niger-Delta militias 
(Allen, 2009: 44; Hazen and Horner, 2007: 81). However, more than an ‘umbrella-
organization’, MEND can be considered an ‘umbrella-term’ (like ‘Al-Qaida’) (Zelinka, 2008: 
72) – a franchise of insurgency. MEND is a fluid and dynamic constellation of militias 
coming together for particular operations before disbanding (Asuni, 2009a: 19). Militias also 
conduct operations independently under the ‘MEND’ banner. However, despite its fluidity 
MEND centres around certain key militias (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 123-125).  
 
MEND has no clear leadership structure and communicates public messages through 
anonymous spokespeople or the pseudonym ‘Jomo Gbomo’ (often written from a permanent 
email account) (Courson, 2011: 31). Any leadership-structure is constructed primarily of 
commanders from its constituent militias. Militant commanders such as Soboma George were 
simultaneously the leader of Outlaws and a commander in MEND, Tompolo is 
simultaneously a commander in FNDIC and MEND (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 124). These 
leaders funnel arms, cash, and provide training to the ad-hoc groups they assemble, as well as 
manage the publicity involved with their operations (Robb, 2007b).  
 
John Robb (sited in Shachtman, 2007) explains that MEND also outsource services on the 
‘bazaar of violence’ by “…[hiring] experts and fighters mostly from criminal gangs and tribal 
warrior cults to do their operations.” Individual insurgents can therefore take on multiple 
roles, have multiple loyalties, and conduct a range of different activities (Bøås, 2011: 122-
123; Robb, 2007b). Briggs (sited in Robb, 2007b) explains that “’Mike’ from Gbaramatu can 
fight for MEND one day, rig an election for his local government chief the next, kidnap a 
foreigner for ransom and get in a cult clash on Saturday.”  
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6.2 Risk-Factor 2: Structural Characteristics of the 
Operating Environment 
The conflict risk to E&P operations can also partly be explained by the structural 
characteristics of the operating environment. Although there are many theories on the causes 
of internal armed conflicts, they can be dichotomized into two baseline arguments. Grievance 
arguments ascribe explanation to belligerents’ intrinsic sentiments of injustice, belonging, or 
identity. Greed arguments on the other hand, ascribe explanation to economic opportunism 
where armed conflict is the result of belligerents’ pursuit of profit. Nevertheless, many armed 
conflicts may best be explained by a combination (Jakobsen, 2007: 59-60). 
 
Referred to in the literature as ‘internal conflict’, ‘civil war’ or ‘low-intensity conflict’, the 
post-Cold War era witnessed a new type of armed conflict – the ‘New Wars’ (Mary Kaldor, 
2006: 1-2). Disintegration of state authority has undermined the state’s ability to maintain a 
monopoly on violence. Subsequently, a privatization of violence has emerged where both 
state and non-state actors participate, as regular armed forces, paramilitaries, self-defence 
groups, foreign mercenaries, and foreign armed forces all contribute to the belligerency 
(Kaldor, 2006: 97). This disintegration has also allowed the emergence of identity politics 
based on ‘primordial loyalties’, where political mobilization revolves around underlying pre-
modern social structures like religion, ethnicity, tribe, clan etc (Kaldor, 2006: 80-82). 
 
Testing such ‘grievance’ arguments statistically, Paul Collier (2000: 95-101) found that they 
had little empirical support as causal variables. Religious/ethnic division and political 
repression actually tended to reduce the risk of armed conflict. He argued that mobilizing 
around ‘grievances’ requires individual action for ‘public good’ and does not cater to the 
individual recruit’s personal incentives. Subsequently, it encourages ‘free-riding’ and is 
unlikely to result in a collective insurgency. However, insurgencies occur when armed groups 
can profit from violent conflict and address the individual insurgent’s personal incentives.  
 
When states become unable to regulate markets and enforce law and order, civil war creates 
opportunities for profit where armed groups will violently compete over market-share 
(Collier, 2000: 101-103). Armed groups can profit through taking economic rents off trade 
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and primary commodity exports by taxing or looting enterprises. In the extractive industry 
insurgents will extort extractive companies by threatening to harm infrastructure or collect 
ransom by kidnapping industry personnel. As a way to mobilize local support, militants will 
tend to employ rhetoric of grievances based on primordial identities and exaggerate 
communal gains from controlling resources (Bannon and Collier, 2003: 4-6). 
 
Collier’s argument may explain how conflicts are financed; it is however less able to explain 
their complex causes (Kaldor et al, 2007: 21). Kenneth Omeje (2008: 1) argues that in 
extractive economies, armed conflict tends to be caused by ‘rentier-politics’. In such 
economies the ‘rentier-state’ will be completely dependent on the revenues made off the 
extractive industry (Omeje, 2008: 5). But instead of making long-term investments rentier-
states will tend to make short-term utilization of revenues, which in the absence of well-
functioning state institutions tends to foster corruption (Omeje, 2006a: 3). 
 
The state is controlled by ‘rentier-elites’ institutionally responsible with the management of 
‘extractive revenues’ (Omeje, 2006a: 3). In doing so, the rentier-elites will dominate the 
‘rentier-space’, which involves the direct and indirect access to extractive rents. ‘Extractive 
rents’ such as oil rents, refers to extractive revenues and the related benefits (any value 
directly or indirectly generated form the extractive industry) (Omeje, 2008: 10). The rentier-
state is characterized by neo-patrimonialism, where the public/private distinction becomes 
permeable and public positions becomes a platform from which the office-holder can 
distribute rents to himself and his patronage-network (Omeje, 2006a: 3). As a result, a range 
of state policies, institutional practices, and judicial statutes is actually constructed to allow 
the rentier-elites access to ‘extractive rents’ (Omeje, 2008: 8). 
 
As the distribution of rents follow along paths of patronage, the population will be divided 
along lines of primordial loyalties (like ethnicity, religion, tribe, clan etc.) (Bøås, 2011: 116-
117). Consequently, disaffected groups will often experience grievances based on primordial 
identity and challenge the legitimacy of the rentier-state (Omeje, 2008: 6). The rentier-space 
becomes a ‘political chessboard’ where various actors contend for access. This competition 
resembles a ‘tug-of-war’ where the rentier-state and international stakeholders pull the rentier-
space towards nationalization and internationalization, and sub-national forces pull it down 
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towards localization (figure 8). Insurgency can therefore be explained by the sub-national 
challenge against the rentier-elites’ dominance of the rentier-space (Omeje, 2008: 9-13).  
 
Figure 8: The competition for the rentier-space 
 
(Source: Omeje, 2008: 12) 
 
Although Omeje is able to explain the grievance-based insurgencies against rentier-states, he 
is unable to explain how the competition becomes violent, the presence of armed conflict 
between non-state actors, or the occurrence of bunkering, piracy and kidnapping for ransom. 
Nevertheless, neither Collier’s nor Omeje’s argument is essentially wrong Kaldor et al. (2007: 
24-26) argues, but merely explains ‘rent-seeking’ at different levels and phases. Rather than 
political competition over public revenue management policies, ‘rent-seeking’ is the intense 
political competition for private access to oil rents. The ‘greed’ argument explains rent-
seeking at the local level, and the ‘rentier-politics’ argument explains rent-seeking in state and 
society. 
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The argument is that certain characteristics of an oil economy makes it particularly 
predisposed to causing armed conflict. As the oil industry is non-labour intensive and national 
income is based primarily on oil revenues, wealth accumulation is delinked from labour and 
creates an economy of consumers rather than producers (Kaldor et al, 2007: 12). Furthermore, 
the oil industry has the potential to create a ‘resource curse’ as inflation, caused by the influx 
of revenues directly into the economy, makes domestic producers uncompetitive versus 
cheaper imports. As a result other economic sectors are suffocated and economic development 
is suppressed (Arthur, 2006: 354). 
 
The oil industry does not create much employment and has little positive spill-over effects on 
other economic sectors. As revenues are transmitted almost exclusively through government, 
it creates incentives for rent-seeking by tapping public resources. It is an enclave industry 
where wealth is highly concentrated, attracting the attention of various actors seeking to claim 
their stake. Furthermore, volatile oil prices leads to frequent economic shocks that has 
negative influences on budgetary discipline, public finance-control, and state planning, 
resulting in political instability and inadequate economic development (Kaldor et al, 2007: 
13-14). 
 
The consequence is rent-seeking competition at all levels of society, which undermines the 
integrity of the state and tends to pull the country into a ‘rent-seeking cycle’ (table 1). When 
oil production is still nascent, some states will introduce appropriate revenue management 
policies. However, in weak states oil rents will be claimed by a number of actors. At this 
point, the state will be able to provide relative political stability and economic development 
by restraining rent-seeking through repression and patronage. Nevertheless, as volatile oil 
prices make this impossible to sustain, the state will increasingly be challenged by non-state 
actors particularly in the areas of oil production (Kaldor et al, 2007: 25-28). 
 
Faced with unrestrained rent-seeking by non-state actors the governing elite will abandon 
aspirations for economic development and will retain power simply for self-enrichment. Any 
sort of unifying national idea will be replaced by primordial loyalties. Intensive rent-seeking 
by a range of state and non-state actors will lead to violent rent-seeking competition. Unable 
to sustain a monopoly of violence the competition becomes dominated by militant non-state 
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actors. However, as oil extraction is dependent on state infrastructures, militants have vested 
interests in preventing complete state collapse (Kaldor et al, 2007: 29-31). 
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Table 1: The rent-seeking cycle 
 
(Source: Kaldor et al, 2007: 26) 
 
Kaldor et al. (2007: 24) suggests that declining oil prices reduce the state’s capacity for 
patronage, leading to an increase in the conflict level. However, a quantitative study from 
Colombia showed that oil prices were positively correlated with armed conflict: when oil 
prices increased, militant attacks would also increase (Dube and Vargas, 2008: 24). The 
conclusion was that rises in oil prices would increase oil revenues to local administrative 
units, encouraging armed rent-seeking competition between militant non-state actors resulting 
in armed conflict (Dube and Vargas, 2008: 26-27). 
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6.2.1 Primordial Loyalties in the Niger-Delta 
In the Niger-Delta, political mobilization has largely revolved around social structures based 
on primordial loyalties, such as ethnic-group, clan, and community. Nigeria has a population 
of about 160 million people divided into a number of ethnic-groups (map 4) of which Hausa-
Fulani comprise 29%, Yoroba 21%, Igbo 18% and Ijaw 10%. The Hausa-Fulani are largely 
based in Northern Nigeria, the Yorobas are based in the South-West of Nigeria and the Igbos 
in the South-East Nigeria. The Ijaws are based in the South-South region where the Niger-
Delta is located (BBC, 2012a). 
 
Map 4: Nigeria’s ethnic composition 
 
(Source: BBC, 2012a) 
 
In the Niger-Delta, communal identity is based on religious identity, ethnic kinship, clan 
structures, and extended families (communities). There are about 20 ethnic-groups, of which 
the Ijaw ethnic-group is the dominant followed by Itsekiri, Eteche, Urhobo, Efik, Ibibio, 
Ikwerre, Ogoni, Abua, and Ndokwa. Ethnic-groups are further sub-divided into clan-
structures, with a number of different clans in the Niger-Delta (Ibaba, 2011a: 73; Orogun, 
2010: 466).  
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The Niger-Delta is home to about 30 million people, divided into about 3,000 communities 
(Shell, 2012b). In SPDC’s area of operation are about 1,200 communities (Francis et al., 2011 
84). Each community is headed by a traditional chief responsible for managing communal 
assets like farm-land and fishing-grounds. The community will collectively protect political 
rights and physical security, often by employing community-militias (Francis et al., 2011 29, 
31).  
6.2.1.1 The Ethnic-groups 
The Ogoni is a small ethnic-group of about 500,000 inhabiting a land of 404 square miles east 
of Port Harcourt in Rivers State (Okonta and Douglas, 2001: 75-76). In the early 1990s 
Ogoniland hosted 3% of SPDC’s oil production, but currently hosts no such production 
(Amunwa and Mikio, 2011: 16). The very raison d'être of MOSOP is to serve the interests of 
the Ogoni ethnic-group (Nodland and Hjellestad, 2007: 12). 
 
The Ijaw (alt. Ijo or Izon) is the largest ethnic-group in the Niger-Delta with over 15 million 
people spread over six States (Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, Rivers and Ondo) (Ibaba, 2011a: 
73). The Ijaws are minorities in every State except Bayelsa. Ijawland account for 75% of 
Nigeria’s onshore oil production and 90% of the offshore production (Ibaba, 2011a: 73).  
 
Advocacy groups like INC and IYC, as well as militias like the Bush-Boys, Egbesu-Boys, 
NDPVF, FNDIC, and MEND all have a strong agenda of Ijaw ethnic nationalism (Hazen and 
Horner, 2007: 109, 123, 127; Ukiwo, 2007: 599-602). In order to gain legitimacy in Ijaw 
communities, MEND has tapped into Ijaw traditional beliefs and the sense of collective 
grievances (Obi, 2010: 230). Many of the MEND militants believe in the Ijaw riverine-deity 
Egbesu, which is believed to be able to protect militants from physical harm (Nodland and 
Hjellestad, 2007: 17). Ijaw militants will often front the symbol of Egbesu through white for 
peace and red for the fighting spirit (Peel, 2009: 183). Although MEND often fronts Ijaw 
rhetoric, it does not seem to be fostering an Ijaw-identity in its propaganda operations or 
promote Ijaw interests versus other ethnic-groups (Zelinka, 2008: 72-73).  
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6.2.1.2 The Clans 
The Gbaramatu clan (ethnic Ijaw) is composed of 65,000 people organized into about 50 
communities, situated along the Escravos River and adjoining creeks in Delta State with 
Oporoza as its capital. Chieftaincy rotates between eight ruling communities where a grand-
chief (Pere) is elected by representatives of the Okerenkoko community (Courson, 2007: 3-5). 
Gbaramatu hosts SPDC and Chevron energy-infrastructure, producing about 400,000 bpd 
(Courson, 2007: 14). The Gbaramatu clan has been essential to many of the Ijaw ethnic-
militias like Egbesu-Boys, FNDIC and a number of smaller militias (Courson, 2007: 25-28), 
as well as having a central place in MEND (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 123). MEND-
commander Tompolo, is a Gbaramatu from the Okerenkoko community (BBC, 2009). 
 
The Kalabari clan (ethnic Ijaw) is composed of about 400,000 people living in Rivers State. 
They are renowned for their entrepreneurship and aptitude. Traditionally the Kalabari clan is 
organized into a hierarchy of semi-autonomous corporative units under a grand-chief 
(Amayanabo) (Wariboko, 1999: 19-20). The units run on profit-based incentives and 
hierarchical mobilization is based on productiveness (Wariboko, 1999: 27-28). The Kalabari 
land stretches across Degema, Asari-Torlu, and Akuku-Torlu LGAs in Rivers State (Hazen 
and Horner, 2007: 131).  
 
Both NDPVF and NDSF have their support-base in the Kalabari clan (Hazen and Horner, 
2007: 128, 131). Dokubo-Asari is from the Kalabari clan, claiming to have gained chieftaincy 
and admitted to the highest Kalabari cult – the ‘Kalabari Ekini Society’ (Onoyume, 2007). 
Soboma George was also a Kalabari, with his Outlaws operating mainly in Kalabari territory 
(Hazen and Horner, 2007: 134). 
 
The Nembe clan (ethnic Ijaw) is composed of about 100,000 people in Bayelsa State. 
Traditionally the Nembe have a rigid power hierarchy where a grand-chief (Amayanabo) rule 
over several communities headed by sub-chiefs, which are responsible for electing a grand-
chief from the Mingi community. SPDC and Agip operate and produce about 150,000 bpd on 
Nembe land. Nembe also hosts Bonny and Brass oil terminals (Kemedi, 2005: 2-4). 
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6.2.2 Rent-Seeking in Nigeria  
In Nigeria, certain characteristics of the oil economy encourages rent-seeking at all levels of 
society. Before oil production fully commenced, Nigeria was among Africa’s top producers of 
peanuts, palm oil and cocoa, but by the 1970s oil production had nearly suffocated the 
agricultural sector (Arthur, 2006: 357). Today the oil industry makes up most of the Nigerian 
economy. The sector contributed 0.3% to Nigeria’s GDP in 1960, by 1975 it contributed 
19.3%, and in 2008 39% of the GDP. In 1960 oil exports contributed to 2.3% of Nigeria’s 
total export, by 1975 it contributed to 92.6% and in 2008 99% of the total export (table 2) 
(Luqman and Lawal, 2011: 64-65).  
 
Table 2: Oil and gas contributions to Nigeria’s GDP and total export (million Naira) 
 
(Source: Luqman and Lawal, 2011: 64-65) 
 
The Nigerian state is an archetypical ‘rentier-state’ as it is completely dependent on oil 
revenues. Oil revenues contributed nothing to the national revenue in 1961 and only 26.1% in 
1970, however due to rises in oil price and the Nigerian government’s ability in negotiating 
favourable tax regimes, oil revenues became a massive source of income and contributed 
77.4% to the national revenue in 1975 and increased to 82.9% by 2008 (table 3) (Luqman and 
Lawal, 2011: 66-67). We have found that this has led to rent-seeking both within state 
institutions (including the oil sector) and outside these institutions. 
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Table 3: The contribution of oil revenues to Nigeria’s national revenue (million Naira) 
 
(Source: Luqman and Lawal, 2011: 66-67) 
6.2.2.1 Institutional Rent-Seeking 
In Nigeria, access to state institutions encourages institutional rent-seeking. As primordial 
loyalties weigh heavier than the responsibilities of public office, neo-patrimonialism tends to 
determine the behaviour of public officials more than their institutional roles. Once an 
individual reaches key public position, ethnic/community kinsmen will put immense 
pressures on him to provide them with patronage through a range of services and benefits 
(Agbiboa, 2011).  
 
The Nigerian political-elite has therefore developed into a constellation of ethnic/community-
patrons that compete for a slice of the ‘national cake’ (i.e. public resources) for themselves, 
for clients in their patronage-networks, and for their ethnic/community kinsmen. During 
political positioning and elections, these patrons will rely on patronage-networks for 
ethnic/community mobilization in their support. Subsequently, as elected officials will form 
policies that channels the bulk of public resources to clients and ethnic/community kinsmen, 
democratic elections at all administrative levels play out as zero-sum games where the winner 
takes it all (Francis et al., 2011: 37; Ikpe, 2009: 682-683). 
 
Rent-Seeking in Oil Revenue Management 
Oil revenue management is the process by which oil revenues are collected, politically 
administered, shared among different administrative divisions, and utilized through public 
expenditures (McPherson, 2005: 469-471). The 1999 Nigerian Constitution, section 44 (3) 
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grants Federal-government ownership and control over all oil and gas resources in Nigeria, 
and the authority to manage revenues as prescribed by the legislative National Assembly 
(NA) (Iledare and Suberu, 2010: 2). Given the state’s legislative and executive roles, laws and 
policies will tend to facilitate rent-seeking by the political-elites (Omeje, 2006a: 49). 
 
The federal political system primarily functions as a device for the allocation of centrally 
collected oil revenues (Francis et al., 2011: 27). Since 2004, revenues have been deposited 
into a ‘Distributive Pool Account’ (DPA) on the basis of estimated oil prices. The balance 
from actual oil prices, are deposited into an ‘Excess Crude Account’ (ECA). From the DPA 
13% is set aside as derivation for oil producing States, while the remainder is allocated 
between Federal-government (48.5%), State Governments (26.72%), Local Governments 
(LGAs) (20.6%), and centrally controlled special funds (4.18%), before being distributed 
according to certain parameters (Iledare and Suberu, 2010: 2-5). 
 
The NA is largely an arena for ethnic competition between party factions. Politics resembles a 
bazaar where services and favours are exchanged in a bid for oil rents in the form of budget 
items, development allocations, official appointments etc. It is composed of patronage 
structures where politicians are incorporated into patronage-networks surrounding key 
patrons. Federal government has tended to manipulate these networks in order to wield 
influence in the NA (Lewis, 2010: 2-4).  
 
In fact, the Nigerian state comprises a vast patronage-network, where the President holds a 
key position with substantial capacity for patronage (Stratfor, 2011e). As public office is 
obtained by bargaining with a network of patrons, State and LGA officials owe loyalty to 
regional political patrons, which in turn owe loyalty to patrons at the national-level. Any 
client that come into conflict with a patron, risks losing patronage and could be ousted from 
position (Stratfor, 2009d). Political patrons will often act as political ‘godfathers’ by 
sponsoring candidates during elections in return for favours and access to oil rents (Ikpe, 
2009: 692). 
 
Federal public expenditure budgets and public procurement is authorized and monitored by 
NA, though quite ineffectively. State public budgets are authorized and monitored by the 
‘State House of Assembly’, but as Governors finance party colleagues in State Assembly, the 
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Governor holds a lot of sway. Budgeting in LGAs follow similar system, but with even less 
oversight (Gboyega et al, 2011: 32-33). As a result, the administrative divisions are all 
characterized by extensive rent-seeking, patronage, and misappropriation by political-elites 
(Otite, 2009: 163). Furthermore, budgets are supplemented by disbursements from the ECA, 
but due to lack of oversight and transparency the ECA functions largely as a ‘slush fund’ for 
misappropriation by government officials (Stratfor, 2012a). 
 
As government officials are under tremendous pressure to reward clients and kinsmen, public 
expenditures tends to be dictated by patronage rather than policy (Francis et al., 2011: 31). It 
is therefore commonly perceived that having an ethnic kinsman in government is crucial to 
the provision of public utilities (like electricity, water, education, healthcare etc.) and benefits 
like procurement contracts (Ikpe, 2009: 648). In the 1980s, ‘structural adjustment 
programmes’ led to the privatization of public utilities providers, allowing the rentier-elites to 
access oil revenues by obtaining procurement contracts through front-companies. Such front-
companies also facilitate patronage by awarding contracts to clients and employment 
opportunities to kinsmen (Anugwom, 2011: 212-213). 
 
Financed by the special fund, the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission 
(OMPADEC) was established in 1992 to address the development issues of the Niger-Delta. 
However, OMPADEC seemed just another avenue for rent-seeking as officials were taking 
kickbacks on contracts and funnelling money through ghost companies and projects (Okonta 
and Douglas, 2001: 32-35). With the 1999 Constitution, OMPADEC was replaced with the 
Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) mandated to provide the Niger-Delta with 
public utilities. However, NDDC officials were being accused of misappropriation and giving 
procurement contracts to kinsmen (Francis et al., 2011: 74-76, 79). 
 
Rent-Seeking in the Oil Industry 
Laws and policies relating to the oil industry are among the most politicized in Nigeria’s legal 
system (Omeje, 2006b: 212). Rent-seeking by the rentier-elites has largely been facilitated by 
economic nationalization and Nigerianization policies (Ukiwo, 2008: 79). The Nigerian 
Content Act (NCA) of 2010 is just one of the latest of a range of legislations facilitating rent-
seeking through Nigerianization (Ovadia, 2011: 30-32). 
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NNPC was established in 1971 in response to calls by OPEC for members to acquire 51% 
stake in their oil sector. The Indigenization of Foreign Enterprises Decree in 1972 obliged 
foreign companies to conduct E&P operations in joint venture with NNPC (sharing 
operational costs), where NNPC were to hold majority shares (Omeje, 2006b: 218). This was 
meant to increase the state control of the oil industry and maximise revenues to the Nigerian 
government (Ibeanu and Luckham, 2007: 57). As a result the government currently takes 
77.5% of the revenues generated by the oil industry (among the world’s highest) (Ukiwo, 
2008: 77).  
 
Furthermore, Indigenization allowed political patrons to award key positions in the oil 
industry to their clients (Ikpe, 2009: 687). Subsequently, the NNCP has become infiltrated by 
a vast patronage-network (Stratfor, 2011e). NNPC officials will channel oil rents by 
embezzling funds from the Joint Venture Cash Call Account which covers operational costs; 
by misappropriating incoming revenues into foreign shadow-accounts; and by unauthorized 
production and sales (‘topping-off’) of oil in excess of the OPEC quota. Topping-off has also 
been conducted by ‘Department of Petroleum Resources’ (DPR) officials when supervising 
oil sales at marine terminals. These are believed to get away by paying off politicians 
(Emewu, 2008). 
 
Paradoxically Nigeria imports the majority of refined oil products which are sold at 
government subsidised price. Distributors will import oil at market price and sell at subsidised 
price, before collecting reimbursement for the difference by NNPC. However, importers will 
often buy refined products at subsidised price and ‘reimport’ it to again collect the subsidy 
reimbursement. Licenses to import are annually awarded by NNCP (Gillies, 2009). This has 
facilitated rent-seeking by allowing the rentier-elites to form an import-cartel (Stratfor, 
2012a). 
 
Furthermore, Indigenization required foreign oil companies to replace expatriate personnel 
with Nigerians. Currently about 90% of managerial and technical personnel in foreign oil 
companies are Nigerians. This has allowed the rentier-elites to grant prized positions to clients 
in their patronage-networks (Omeje, 2006b: 219). This tendency has ben further reinforced by 
the NCA, as it stipulates a maximum of 5% of expatriates in management positions (Ovadia, 
2011: 7). 
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The Land Use Act of 1979 (LUA-79) allowed Governors to expropriate any private land in 
his State and grant it to any private party. As Section 27 of the LUA-79 prevents legal 
oversight, land allocation has largely facilitated patronage (Omeje, 2006b: 220-222). Since 
the introduction of Production Sharing Contracts (operational costs are covered by the oil 
company) in 1999, licenses to oil blocks have been awarded through bidding-rounds 
conducted by the DPR (Gillies, 2009). However, this has allowed the rentier-elites to access 
oil rent by being awarded licenses through front-companies (Omeje, 2006b: 219). This 
tendency has been reinforced by the NCA as Nigerian E&P companies are given first 
consideration in the bidding-rounds (Ovadia, 2011: 7). 
 
The policy of ‘national content’ in the oil industry has been solidified in the NCA, as it 
requires foreign oil companies to outsource services to Nigerian upstream-support 
subcontractors. This has been justified as causing spill-over effects to other economic sectors 
(Ovadia, 2011: 7-8, 12). Consequently, in 2011 SPDC awarded 68% of its contracts to 
Nigerian companies (Shell, 2012d). However, this has facilitated rent-seeking and patronage 
by allowing rentier-elites with industry experience to channel funds through front companies 
in the upstream-support sector (Ovadia, 2011: 2-3). 
6.2.2.2 Extra-Institutional Rent-Seeking 
In the Niger-Delta, the absence of opportunities for traditional livelihoods or employment has 
encouraged extra-institutional rent-seeking. The oil industry has had a detrimental impact on 
the natural environment in the Niger-Delta. An estimation of 546 million gallons of oil has 
annually poured into the natural environment throughout the years of production. Oil spills 
and gas flaring has directly impacted the livelihoods of local communities, as 60%-100% of 
the income of the poorest half is generated through environmental resources like fisheries and 
agriculture. The adverse effects on traditional livelihoods has not been replaced by 
employment opportunities in the oil industry (Francis et al., 2011: 38-42) 
 
The oil industry provides employment to less than 0.15% of the Nigerian work-force (Ovadia, 
2011: 4). Lacking the required technical skills, most employment opportunities have gone to 
expatriates or Nigerians from outside the Niger-Delta (Idemudia, 2010: 838). As the industry 
is highly capital intensive, it creates little opportunity for local unskilled labour. As a result, 
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unemployment and underemployment rates are higher in the core oil producing States than 
the rest of Nigeria. Consequently, people in the local communities of the Niger-Delta have 
found other avenues of generating an income (Francis et al., 2011: 29-30). 
 
Rent-Seeking through ‘Host-Community’ Status 
Local communities in the Niger-Delta have tended to approach the oil companies directly 
(often quite assertively) as an avenue for rent-seeking (Ukiwo, 2008: 82). Oil companies are 
perceived as a major source of oil rent, as they administer the designation of ‘host 
community’ to local communities within their area of operation (Orogun, 2010: 493). ‘Host-
communities’ are the communities which hosts energy-infrastructure or are environmentally 
affected by operations (Akpan, 2010: 070). This entitles communities able to lay claim to land 
on which E&P operations are conducted, to certain provisions like contracts, employment and 
compensation (Francis et al., 2011: 34).  
 
Where government has neglected responsibilities, oil companies have often been persuaded 
into in providing host-communities with public utilities through ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ (CSR) initiatives or part of ‘Memoranda of Understanding’ (MoU) (Francis et 
al., 2011: 83-86). However, this has encouraged rent-seeking by community leaders by 
misappropriating development funds. For example, local leaders from the Ugborodo-
community misappropriated funds given by Chevron for community development (Otite, 
2009: 166). Furthermore, giving host-communities reparations for environmental damage has 
encouraged rent-seeking through enlarging oil spills, preventing clean-up for remediation 
contracts, or cash compensation (Francis et al., 2011: 41). 
 
Companies have also signed ‘security/surveillance’ contracts with host communities (or 
armed groups) for the provision of security in exchange for oil rent. However, as community 
youth often began disrupting operations as a way of extorting oil rent, companies were 
induced to offer ‘stay-at-home’ payments (Omeje, 2006a: 90-91). Rather than giving them 
employment opportunities, companies began giving ‘ghost-contracts’ and ‘standby-
employment’ to pacify community youth (Ikelegbe, 2005: 225). 
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Rent-Seeking through Criminal Activity 
Systems-disruptions like kidnapping, piracy and bunkering has not only provided armed 
groups with tactical leverage for political objectives, it has also facilitated rent-seeking by 
looting and extorting the oil industry in a politico-criminal symbiosis (Giroux, 2010: 48-50).  
As the oil industry has largely crippled the fishing-economy through pollution, but also 
induced abundant shipping traffic and a range of offshore energy-infrastructure, it has 
essentially encouraged piracy as ships and offshore energy-infrastructure will be robbed or 
seized for ransom by unemployed fishermen (Whiteneck, 2011: 31-33). Pirates will also 
siphon off oil from tankers. Initially piracy was a subsistence trade but has over the past year 
become a growing industry, involving the facilitation by oil industry insiders and political 
elites (Hansen and Stefen, 2011). 
 
The presence of oil personnel and a concentration of wealthy people in an otherwise 
impoverished Niger-Delta have encouraged kidnappings for ransom. Initially kidnappings 
were almost exclusively a militant tactic to publicize political objectives, but ransom became 
introduced to finance the militancy. Around 2007 kidnapping had become a profitable 
industry involving the facilitation of political elites. These would also hire cults to kidnap 
political opponents. The kidnapping industry have also had spill-over effects to lower levels 
of society, as unemployed youths will target anybody able to muster a ransom (Akpan, 2010a: 
38-40). 
 
Nevertheless, the largest criminal industry involves bunkering. Unemployment combined 
with the presence of a myriad of pipelines and well-heads, in addition to an oil hungry black-
market, has encouraged bunkering by tapping into pipeline or well-head to draw oil. This is 
transported to refineries and sold at the black-market (Asuni, 2009b: 4-5). The bunkering 
industry has become a multibillion dollar industry involving local communities and armed 
groups, as well as the facilitation of military officers, political elites, oil company insiders, 
and international syndicates (Asuni, 2009b: 5-6). Initially armed groups were limited to 
provide security for bunkering operations, but later became primary stakeholders in the 
industry (Ibaba and Ikelegbe, 2010: 230). Bunkering is currently the main source of funding 
for armed groups (Osaghae et al, 2011: 26). By conducting systems-disruptions they have 
managed to increase oil-prices to maximise returns on black-market oil (Robb, 2007a: 128). 
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6.2.3 Rent-Seeking Conflict in the Niger-Delta 
These enormous rent-seeking opportunities make oil economies like the Nigerian, 
exceedingly prone to conflict as actors compete to control the access to oil rents (Ikelegbe, 
2005: 216). The proliferation of arms has often led such rent-seeking competitions to be 
contested violently (Francis et al., 2011 49).  
 
Such violent rent-seeking competitions have materialized at both the local and national levels. 
The local level involves dynamics confined to the area of operation and will to a large extent 
encompass the operations influence and interactions with its host environment. At the national 
level this interaction is less important (McKellar, 2010: 72-73), as it largely involves 
dynamics related to the political system and internal conflict in the country as whole (Brink, 
2004: 38). 
6.2.3.1 Rent-Seeking Conflict at the Local Level 
At the local level, conflict risk-events to SPDC’s E&P operations in the Niger-Delta are the 
product of competition for control over access to oil rents between local communities and the 
oil companies; within communities; between communities; between local ethnic-groups; and 
between armed groups. 
 
Conflict between communities and oil companies 
Since the 1980s many local communities have been quite assertive in the pursuit of benefits 
related to ‘host-community’ status. These have used strategies like community protest and 
occupying or sabotaging energy-infrastructures, as a way of levying oil rent off companies in 
the form of employment, reparations, security and procurement contracts, and MoUs or CSR 
initiatives giving public utilities and scholarships etc (Ikelegbe, 2005: 217). As can be seen in 
the table below (table 4), SPDC regularly experience such conflicts. Most recently, in April 
2012 the Nembe Island community blocked SPDC personnel from reaching oil rigs in 
demand for electricity, water and schools (BBC, 2012b).  
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Table 4: Selected incidents of community action to  
levy oil rents form companies (2002-2003) 
 
(Source: Ikelegbe, 2005: 218) 
 
However, as local communities became increasingly militant, community-militias were 
mobilized to threaten or systems-disrupt E&P operations in extortion for cash and conduct 
kidnappings of oil personnel for ransom (Ikelegbe, 2005: 217-218). Such actions have often 
been taken in collusion with oil company Community Liaison Officers (CLO), but most of the 
winnings will be retained by the CLOs and community chiefs often leaving little for the 
community at large (Kemedi, 2005: 14). In the 1990s an engineer with Elf, Nimi Barigha-
Amage colluded with a chief in the Nembe clan to extort SPDC to make payments to the local 
(Kemedi, 2005: 6). 
 
Conflict within communities 
Such community rent-seeking has often produced armed intra-community conflict, as 
community leaders have misappropriated oil rents intended for the community at large or 
used it for patronage as means of gaining local power (Francis et al., 2011: 35). Furthermore, 
the implementation of ‘security contracts’ has tended to produce armed conflicts, as it alters 
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the internal balance of power. This has often caused factions within the community (such as 
local youths) to challenge the traditional leadership-structures. When such intra-communal 
conflicts have occurred, disaffected parties have often conducted systems-disruptions to 
undermine the adversary’s arrangement with the oil companies (Omeje, 2006a: 92).  
 
Acting under the guise of an advocacy group, Lionel Jonathan used oil rent provided by 
SPDC for the Nembe community to build himself up as a local patron in charge of the 
‘Isongo-foru’ community-militia. SPDC would employ the Isongo-foru to provide security for 
their local operations. When the community-militia became excessively powerful, the 
antagonised traditional leadership formed the ‘Agbara-foru’, resulting in armed conflict 
between the two community-militias in late 1995. In response to SPDC favouring the Isongo-
foru, the traditional leadership ordered systems-disruptions of SPDC energy-infrastructure in 
Nembe Creek (Kemedi, 2005: 6-9). 
 
Conflict between communities 
At the core of inter-community conflicts in the Niger-Delta is the issue of which communities 
should be considered ‘host-community’ and entitled to benefits. As land ownership is the 
decisive factor of ‘host-community’ status, competition between communities has tended to 
produce armed conflict over territorial disputes and the location of energy-infrastructure 
(Francis et al., 2011: 34-35). Ownership over land hosting E&P operations has also produced 
inter-community conflict over ownership over and access to bunkering-spots (Francis et al., 
2011: 36; Shelley, 2005: 68-69). 
 
Such inter-community territorial conflicts were further exacerbated by the LUA-79, as land 
expropriation would qualify communities to compensations, reparations for environmental 
degradation, and ‘host-community’ status (Omeje, 2006a: 42-43, 54, 61). As a result when 
OMPADEC was created, several communities clashed in armed conflicts in a scramble for oil 
rich land that would entitle them to compensations, reparations, ‘host community’ status, and 
development projects (Omeje, 2006a: 142). 
 
In such rent-seeking competitions communities have mobilized community-militias, often 
financed by diverted development funds (Asuni, 2009a: 12). Oil companies will often employ 
community-militias for the protection of E&P operations through ‘security contracts’. 
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However, as different communities will compete over ‘security contracts’ with oil companies 
it has a tendency to produce armed inter-community conflicts or systems-disruptions as 
communities will attempt undermine their rival community’s ‘security contract’ by proving 
them unworthy (Watts, 2007: 651).  
 
Given the state’s function as a device for revenue allocation where political representation 
equals access to oil revenues, democratization created a political space where communities 
have been pitted against each other in rent-seeking competition often resulting in armed 
conflict (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 10). The distribution formula that exists at a Federal-level 
is non-existent at State-level, where State-government controls how revenues are allocated 
between the LGAs. The core issue therefore becomes which community should to be 
considered ‘oil producing communities’ and entitled to additional revenue allocations through 
their LGA (Akpan, 2010: 071).  
 
A longstanding armed conflict was caused by conflicting claims by the Soku and Elem-
Sangama communities of the Kalabari clan, and the Oluasiri community of the Nembe clan, 
over territory and subsequent designation of ‘host community’ to SPDC’s ‘Soku Gas Plant’ 
(and subsequent bunkering ‘rights’) (Francis et al., 2011: 36). When Bayelsa State was 
created in 1996 it drew a boundary between the Kalabari and he Nembe clans, however this 
did not remove the cause of the conflict which was amplified by conflicting territorial claims 
by Bayelsa and Rivers State-governments (Zalik, 2011: 194). It is therefore not unthinkable 
that these State-governments have fought the conflict out in proxy through the Kalabari and 
Nembe clans.  
 
Conflict between ethnic-groups 
At the core of inter-ethnic armed conflicts in the Niger-Delta is the issue of perceived political 
domination and marginalization of different ethnic-groups (Ibaba and Ikelegbe, 2010: 232). In 
the late 1990s inter-ethnic conflicts attracted Ijaws from across the Niger-Delta in support of 
marginalized kinsmen, resulting in the creation of ethnic-militias like FNDIC, NDPVF and 
the Egbesu-Boys (Ukiwo, 2007: 601-602). Warri has been particularly subject to such inter-
ethnic conflicts as it hosts a substantial part of Nigeria’s oil production, but is also home to 
competing ethnic-groups such as Ijaws, Urhobos and Itsekiris. As LGAs in Warri have 
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traditionally been politically dominated by Itsekiris, Ijaws have felt a sense of marginalization 
(Courson, 2007: 7-8). 
 
As positions in the oil industry are among the best paid jobs in Nigeria (a single employee 
will be able to support ten to fifteen family members) (Idemudia, 2010: 837), ethnic-groups 
have come into conflict over employment opportunities and upstream-support contracts 
(Asuni, 2009a: 11). A contributing factor to the Ijaw-Itsekiri conflicts in Warri was that as the 
traditional Itsekiri chief (Olu) of Warri owned the company that recruited for Chevron, he was 
perceived by Ijaws as using his official position to secure employment and contracts in the oil 
industry for his own kinsmen (Ukiwo, 2007: 596). 
 
As LGAs are entitled to revenue allocations, inter-ethnic competition over the creation of 
LGAs has tended to produce inter-ethnic armed conflict. The location of LGA headquarters 
have been a particularly contentious issue, as it involves infrastructure, amenities, and 
employment opportunities (Ibaba and Ikelegbe, 2010: 232). In 1997 armed conflict between 
Ijaws and Itsekiris erupted in Warri, as the headquarters of an Ijaw LGA was to be located in 
an Itsekiri town. This resulted in the blockades of several SPDC energy-infrastructures 
(Francis et al., 2011: 26).  
 
As political positions functions as platforms for rent-seeking and patronage, where 
officeholders will channel oil revenues to his own ethnic-group, elections for Federal-, State-, 
and Local Government (which are held simultaneously) have been characterized by zero-sum 
inter-ethnic competitions often erupting in armed conflict (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 7). In 
1999, ethnic conflict between Ijaws and Itsekiris was triggered by the election of James Ibori 
as Governor of Delta State, as he supported a bill that would grant Ijaws of Warri their own 
LGA (Courson, 2007: 18).  
 
Conflict between Armed Groups 
With authority over massive revenues, Governorships in oil producing States give abundant 
opportunity for rent-seeking and patronage (Francis et al., 2011: 45). However, given the 
zero-sum disposition of government elections, political candidates has tended to employ 
armed groups as political-enforcers for the electoral competition, for candidatures within the 
political parties (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 7), and by ‘political godfathers’ to penalize 
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candidates for breaches of agreement  (Ikpe, 2009: 692). As a consequence, (pre/post) 
election periods have become occurrences of electoral violence, as armed groups conduct 
kidnappings, assassinations, and clash in support of their political patron (Hazen and Horner, 
2007: 59). 
 
Governors will allegedly finance political-enforcement through a budget item called the 
‘security vote’. This item is intended for maintaining security and constitutes one of the 
largest revenue allocations in the national budget, but State-governments are not obliged to 
report on how it is utilized (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 89). Political-enforcement will also be 
financed by bunkering profits and kidnapping ransoms (Stratfor, 2009g).  
 
During the 2003 election, incumbent Governor Peter Odili employed both the NDVS and 
NDPVF to enforce his re-election in Rivers State (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 77). Competing 
for the Rivers Governorship in 2007, Celestine Omehia employed the Outlaws against Rotimi 
Amaechi who in response employed Deebam (Stratfor, 2009c). In 2005 armed conflict 
erupted in Ogoniland, as two contesting candidates, Kenneth Bie Kobani and Pidomson, 
employed Deebam and Deewell as political-enforcers during the PDP primaries (AC, 2011a). 
 
Extra-institutional rent-seeking competition for the control of bunkering territory and 
transportation routes, has also resulted in such armed conflicts (Osaghae et al., 2011: 26). 
Furthermore, armed groups have helped communities into forming community-militias and 
manipulating inter-community conflicts in order to create an environment of insecurity in 
which they can conduct bunkering activities unhindered (Asuni, 2009a: 11-12).  
 
Between 2003 and 2004 the NDPVF and the NDVS supported by their respective allies, 
clashed in armed conflict over stakes in the bunkering industry. The conflict zone was in and 
around Okirika, the site of extensive SPDC energy-infrastructures (Osaghae et al., 2011: 26). 
Okirika has been characterized as the ‘epicenter of bunkering’ (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 
121), and has consequently been host to a widespread armed conflict between NDVS and the 
Bush-Boys (supported by NDPVF) (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 111). 
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6.2.3.2 Rent-Seeking Conflict at the National Level 
Despite widespread armed conflict in the at the local level, it is the competition for control 
over access to oil rents between ethno-religious groups at the national level that has produced 
the most damaging conflict risk-events for SPDC’s E&P operations in the Niger-Delta.  
 
Ethno-religious competition for oil revenues 
As the control over central government is characterized by an intense ethnic competition, 
ethnic-patrons will mobilize kinsmen through patronage-networks (Ikpe, 2009: 694). They 
will employ ethnic advocacy groups and militias outside mainstream political channels, 
utilizing the media to their advantage by playing on traditional beliefs and collective 
grievances (Obi, 2010: 227). Such ethno-religious competitions have occurred both during 
civilian and military regimes, and has increased the potential for armed conflict often 
expressed in the form of military coups, ethno-religious conflict, agitation for new 
States/LGAs, secessionist movements etc (Ikpe, 2009: 694). 
 
A prevalent fault line in Nigeria is between the North and the South; but the cleavage 
conceals more complex ethno-religious divisions that are extremely contentious due to the 
repercussions for political representation and allotment of public resources (Hazen and 
Horner, 2007: 18-21). The North is dominated by Muslims predominantly from the Hausa-
Fulani ethnic-group, whereas the South is dominated by Christians predominantly from the 
Igbo ethnic-group in the South-East and the religiously mixed Yoroba ethnic-group in the 
South-West. In between the North and the South is a ‘Middle-Belt Zone’ mixed between 
Christians and Muslims (map 5) (Lewis, 2010: 5). 
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Map 5: Religious composition of Nigeria 
 
(Source: Stratfor, 2010c) 
 
The North/South fault line exists within most Nigerian state institutions (including the 
military) and involves an intense competition over public positions, power and national 
revenues (Bøås, 2012: 3). The ethno-religious allegiance of government officials is of crucial 
importance as, during both civilian and military government, these are perceived as patrons 
and representatives of their ethnic-group (Ikpe, 2009: 691). The distribution of political power 
along regional lines has reinforced the politization of ethnicity in the competition for oil 
revenues. In this competition the smaller ethnic minorities have tended to lose out against the 
ethnic majorities, dominating at regional and national levels (Obi, 2007: 114). 
 
Given the state’s principal function as a device for revenue allocation basic for public utilities, 
politics in Nigeria largely involves securing control over oil revenues (Francis et al., 2011: 1). 
As a result, under civilian rule the ethno-religious allegiance of political representatives has 
caused elections to play out as zero-sum games (Francis et al., 2011: 37; Ikpe, 2009: 682-
683). Similarly, military coups in Nigeria have also played out as zero-sum games, where 
successful coups gives instant access to oil revenues and futile coups leads to execution 
(Okonta and Douglas, 2003: 37). The result has been five democratic elections and six 
military coups in a sort of Nigerian ‘Game of Thrones’ (table 5). 
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Table 5: Nigeria’s Presidents 
 
(Source: Hazen and Horner, 2007: 8) 
 
The British colonial administration established a decentralized state structure, resulting in a 
Northern Region dominated by Hausa-Fulanis; a Western Region dominated by Yorobas; and 
an Eastern Region dominated by the Igbos. At the national level, competition for government 
representation contributed to ethno-religious conflict between the majorities. At the Regional 
level competition over public resources contributed ethnic conflict between the majority and 
the minorities (Ikpe, 2009: 686). 
 
In government Hausa-Fulani dominated Northern Peoples Congress had by the early 1960s 
begun distributing a disproportionate share of revenues to Northern Nigeria. In 1966 this 
triggered a military coup and General Aguiyi-Ironsi (Southern/Igbo) was installed as head of 
state (Lewis, 2010: 5; Omeje, 2006b: 217; Okonta and Douglas, 2003: 17). Fearing the Igbos 
might seize the Niger-Delta oil fields, Adaka-Boro and his Niger Delta People's Volunteer 
Force instigated an Ijaw armed insurgency for a local autonomous ‘Niger-Delta Republic’, 
but was quashed after only 12 days (Obi, 2007: 118).  
 
In July 1966 a counter-coup was conducted and General Yakubu Gowon (Northern/Ngas) was 
installed as President. Although a Christian, he fervently believed in Northern primacy (Ikpe, 
2009: 688-689). As Nigeria’s four Regions were replaced with 12 States in 1967, the Niger-
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Delta parted Igbo domination Eastern Region. At least partly in a claim to the oil fields, the 
Igbos led an armed secession for an independent Biafra (Obi, 2007: 115). 
 
In 1975 General Murtala Muhammed (Northern/Hausa) deposed Gowon and reintroduced the 
disproportionate distribution of oil revenues to the North, and moved the capital from Lagos 
in the South to Abuja in the North. With his assassination, General Olusegun Obasanjo 
(Southern/Yoroba) stepped in as President. As oil revenues became increasingly centralized, 
the rent-seeking competition became elevated from State/LGA to Federal-government. With 
democratic transition ethnic competition became increasingly intense as Hausa-Fulani 
dominated National Party of Nigeria and Sehu Shagari took control (Ikpe, 2009: 687-689).  
 
However, another military coup in 1983 instated General Muhammadu Buhari 
(Northern/Hausa-Fulani), but in 1985 he was ousted by General Ibrahim Babangida 
(Northern/Gwari) (Okonta and Douglas, 2003: 27-30).  During Babangida’s reign, his home 
state Niger experienced immense infrastructural development. He also neutralized political 
dissidence through a ‘policy of settlement’, where political opponents were paid-off and 
incorporated into his patronage-network (Ikpe, 2009: 690). 
 
As democratizing forces became overwhelming, Babangida initiated a handover to civilian 
rule (Okonta and Douglas, 2003: 37). Nevertheless, when the 1993 election result showed that 
M.K.O Abiola (Southern/Yoroba) had won Babangida annulled the result (Ikpe, 2009: 690). 
Further pressure forced Babangida to form an interim national government and install Ernest 
Shonekan (Southern/Yoroba) as President, but soon General Sani Abacha (Northern/Kanuri) 
was installed after yet another military coup (Okonta and Douglas, 2003: 37).  
 
As Abacha installed only members of the military junta into key public positions, a sense of 
political marginalization and resentment among the other ethnic-groups began to emerge. The 
removal of Admiral Madueke (Southern/Igbo) from the military government therefore 
triggered widespread ethnic agitation among the Igbos (Ikpe, 2009: 690-691). Similarly, the 
murder of Abiola by the Abacha-regime in 1998 led to the creation of the Yoroba ethnic-
militia ‘O’dua People’s Congress’ (OPC) and triggered ethno-religious conflict across Nigeria 
between Yoroba and Hausa-Fulanis (Ikpe, 2009: 694). 
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After Abacha’s death, General Abdusalami Abubakar (Northern/Gwari) was installed. 
Abubakar initiated a transition to civilian rule and elections were held in May 1999 (Lewis, 
2010: 9). Three major parties ran in the 1999 election: All Nigeria People’s Party, Alliance 
for Democracy (AD) and People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Breaking with past ethnic 
structures, these parties were multi-ethnic. In the 1999 election, PDP won 57% of the seats in 
NA, followed by 62% in 2003, and 73% in 2007 (table 6). As PDP gained political hegemony 
it transformed into a platform for rent-seeking competition between party factions (Lewis, 
2010: 10-11), essentially aligned along the North/South fault line (Bøås, 2012: 3). 
 
Table 6: Party representation in the National Assemblies 
 
(Source: Lewis, 2010: 24) 
 
The PDP elected Obasanjo as Presidential candidate, which was under his Presidency able to 
manipulate the patronage-structures to gain a hold of the PDP and Federal-government (Ikpe, 
2009: 691). As this marked a power-shift to the South, political competition between 
North/South factions within the PDP intensified (Lewis, 2010: 14-15). Outside NA ethno-
religious competition erupted in communal conflict between Hausas and Yorobas in Lagos in 
2002, escalating with Hausa reprisals in the North and the involvement of OPC (Ikpe, 2009: 
693-694). 
 
North/South competition between PDP factions intensified as the Northern faction feared the 
2007 election would completely deprive them of political power (Lewis, 2010: 15-16). A 
compromise was made with a ‘rotation-system’ (zoning) where the Presidency rotates two 
terms between the North and the South (and between the regions). As a result PDP nominated 
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Umaru Yar’Adua (Northern/Hausa-Fulani) as candidate. Despite fears, inter-communal 
conflict was restricted to contested areas (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 9). 
 
Local Agitations for ‘Resource Control’ 
Oil producing States have received a decreasing derivation as political elites continuously 
have centralized oil revenues with Federal-government to maximise their own share (Orogun, 
2010: 486-487). Initially, these States received 100% of the oil revenues, but was reduced to 
50% after independence, before gradually declining until the 1999 Constitution guaranteed 
them a 13% derivation (table 7) (Akpan, 2010b: 071). Policies like Indigenization, LUA-79, 
and the creation of NNPC, further centralized oil revenues (Omeje, 2006b: 218-222). 
Although this reduced tensions between ethnic majorities, it exacerbated tensions between 
majorities and the minorities, particularly in the Niger-Delta (Francis et al., 2011: 13). 
 
Table 7: Revenue derivation  
to oil producing States 
 
(Source: Ibaba and Ikelegbe, 2010: 236) 
 
In the Niger-Delta, rent-seeking competition has been expressed through agitations for 
‘resource control’ (Francis et al., 2011: 1). ‘Resource control’ refers to the local control of oil 
revenues; from increased derivation and participation in revenue management, to the 
complete local autonomy and control over the entire oil revenue management process (Ako, 
2011: 42-44). However, ‘resource control’ has often been used to justify bunkering, as 
Dokubo-Asari has argued that “…the oil belongs to us, we’re not stealing it. It’s the Nigerian 
state stealing our oil from us (sited in Gboyega et al, 2011: 19). 
 
Vastly expanding oil production combined with the ‘Oil Boom’ in the 1970s greatly increased 
oil revenues and raised the stakes of the rent-seeking competition. Consequently, by the late 
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1970s ethnic minorities in the Niger-Delta had begun to mobilize peaceful protest (Obi, 2009: 
119). By the 1980s the fall in oil prices combined with the adverse socio-economic effects of 
structural adjustment policies, had led to demands for greater political representation in 
government and the creation of new States in the Niger-Delta (Obi, 2010: 226). 
 
In 1990, MOSOP was established by Ken Saro-Wiwa and other Ogoni elites. The ethnic 
advocacy group made demands for ‘resource control’ in the ’Ogoni Bill Rights’, stating that 
“the right to the control and use of a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni 
development (Obi, 2010: 227).” Saro-Wiwa popularized the struggle and mobilized nearly the 
entire Ogoni ehnic-group. Furthermore, he internationalized the Ogoni plight by presenting 
the Bill to the UN (Omeje, 2006a: 141). By framing the struggle for ‘resource control’ in the 
context of environmental degradation, MOSOP linked up with transnational environmental 
advocacy networks (Soremkun, 2011: 107). 
 
In 1992, MOSOP demanded that oil companies pay back $10 billion in royalties and 
compensation to the Ogonis. Demands were backed by enormous demonstrations and protests 
disrupting SPDC operations. As the Ogonis came increasingly under attack security forces 
protecting energy-infrastructure, SPDC was accused of providing security forces with arms, 
vessels, and finances causing massive reputational harm (Shelley, 2005: 66). As a result, 
MOSOP had managed to permanently stop SPDC’s operations in Ogoniland (Courson, 2007: 
12). However, this triggered extensive military repression of civilian Ogonis, culminating in 
the execution of Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders in November 1995 (Soremkun, 
2011: 107-108).  
 
In the Niger-Delta, the creation of States and LGAs is perceived as the only legal way to gain 
access to oil revenues (Courson, 2007: 26). Although being a major ethnic-group, the Ijaws 
were minorities across six States. In 1991, several Ijaw advocacy groups came together under 
the umbrella of INC in demands for Ijaw States, resulting in the creation of Bayelsa in 1996 
(Courson, 2007: 21-22). Agitations for the creation of LGAs also led to armed conflict in 
Warri. Such agitations resulted in the creation of a range of clan-based ethnic-militias in the 
late 1990s, such as FNDIC and Egbesu-Boys (Courson, 2007: 27-28). 
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In 1998, the IYC in agitations for ‘resource control’ mobilized Ijaw youth from over 500 
communities, 40 clans, and 25 different organizations at Kaiama (Bayelsa). Here they 
communally produced the ‘Kaiama Declaration’ stating that “all land and natural resources 
(including mineral resources) within the Ijaw territory belong to Ijaw communities (Courson, 
2007: 23-24)”. This was followed by ‘Operation Climate Change’, a non-violent protest 
aimed at shutting down energy-infrastructure. The government responded with military 
repression (with logistical support from Chevron), killing 50 activists on January 4
th
 1999 
(Nodland and Hjellestad, 2007: 10). 
 
Soon after transition to democracy Obasanjo deployed further troops, culminating with the 
attack on Odi town (Bayelsa) where over 2.000 civilians were killed in an effort to protect 
energy-infrastructure. This led to growing sentiments that Ijaw political objectives could not 
be met through democratic channels, and agitations for ‘resource control’ shifted from non-
violence to violence as a number of militias emerged (Courson, 2011: 27-28). Nevertheless, 
the dialectical relationship between the government and the militants conceals complex 
forces, where alliances are built, destroyed, and reconstituted (Obi, 2009: 121). 
 
From ‘Resource Control’ to Political-Enforcement 
In the Niger-Delta, ethnic-militias in opposition to government have entered into practical 
patron-client relationships with ethnic-kin factions of the political elites, which are often 
allied to the very elites they are in conflict with (Obi, 2010: 227). National and local political 
patrons will employ ethnic-militants to demonstrate that they and their kinsmen warrant 
political representation in government. Militants will not only coerce voters and intimidate 
political rival, but will use systems-disruptions to coerce top-level political patrons in 
government into granting positions to their ethnic-patrons. Political campaigns will be 
financed by politico-criminal (Stratfor, 2009g). 
 
In the run-up for the 1999 election, PDP functioned basically as a vehicle for gaining public 
position. INC-leader and local ‘political godfather’ Chief Edwin Kiagbodo Clark used this 
opportunity to influence the selection of political candidates. Clark had been a part of the 
patronage-networks of the national political elites since the mid-1970s and was a close ally to 
Obasanjo. In order to secure PDP the election, Clark employed the IYC as political-enforcers 
and financed the endeavour through bunkering. Subsequently, PDP swept the election and 
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installed governors such as James Ibori in Delta, Alamieyeseigha in Bayelsa, and Odili in 
Rivers (Stratfor, 2009a). 
 
By 2001, rivalry had emerged between Clark (ethnic Ijaw) and Odili (ethnic Igbo). As 
Governor of Niger-Delta’s richest State, Odili was able to use oil rent to finance extensive 
patronage which allowed him to remain in the political game by providing PDP-patrons with 
a ‘cut of the action’. Odili also used the NDVS as political-enforcers to preserve his control of 
Rivers, and in return gave them free rein in the Rivers bunkering industry. In order to contain 
Odili and expand Ijaw control of Rivers, Clark employed Dokubo-Asari which formed the 
NDPVF as an ethnic-militia promoting Ijaw interests. The result was an armed conflict 
between NDPVF and NDVS in and around Port Harcourt in 2003 (Stratfor, 2009a). 
 
By 2004 the situation had become so precarious, that Odili deployed State contingents of the 
military to join NDVS in the fight against the NDPVF. Unable to break the NDPVF, Odili 
pleaded with Federal-government for assistance (Stratfor, 2009a). The conflict polarized the 
armed groups and created fault-lines along inter-cult, inter-ethnic, and inter-community 
conflicts. The result was two blocs, where armed groups were allied either with NDPVF or 
NDVS (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 77-79). 
 
In Warri, peaceful women’s protests against Chevron were met by a military response, 
pushing Gbaramatu youths to occupy local energy-infrastructures. But as they were met with 
further military aggression they decided to turn to arms (Courson, 2007: 19). After four naval 
officers got killed, the military attacked Okerenkoko but was thwarted by community-militias. 
In response, the military allied with Itsekiri community-militas to attack Ijaw communities 
around Warri (Courson, 2007: 29-30). FNDIC claimed the military was deployed to 
perpetuate Itsekiri political dominance and declared war on the Federal-government and the 
oil companies (Ukiwo, 2007: 603). 
 
Faced with threats to energy-infrastructure across the Niger-Delta, Federal-government 
drafted the three arms of the military in a combined ‘joint task force’ (JTF) and initiated 
campaign ‘Operation Restore Hope’ (Courson, 2011: 28). Faced with massive military front, 
Dokubo-Asari tuned to a strategy of attacking the Nigerian economy through systems-
disruptions of energy-infrastructure (Courson, 2011: 29). Threats of all-out war on the oil 
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industry, Obasanjo decided to arrange a peace-meeting between Dokubo-Asari and Tom by 
giving compensations for amnesty and disarmament (Courson, 2007: 32-33). 
 
Nevertheless, after the peace agreement NDPVF and NDVS began to fractionalize. Under 
government pressure Tom handed over his second-in-command Soboma George, but he 
managed to escape and went on to form the Outlaws. Furthermore, as Dokubo-Asari 
neglected to sufficiently share compensations, many of the antagonised militants split out of 
the NDPVF to form NDSF under Farah Dagogo. They argued that the reward should also go 
to rehabilitate the militias that had fought alongside NDPVF like Bush-Boys, Greenlander, 
and Deebam (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 130-133). 
 
Political-Enforcement for the 2007 Election 
In the Niger-Delta, the struggle for ‘resource control’ has largely been a collective effort 
involving not only advocacy groups and armed groups, but also regional political elites with 
Governors Alamieyeseigha and Ibori in the vanguard (Ako, 2011: 47). Under the National 
Constitutional Reform Conference Niger-Delta delegates demanded an increase in derivation 
to 50% within five years. Naturally, the offer of 17% was denied (Obi, 2009: 117). 
 
In preparation for the 2007 election, fractional competition within the PDP intensified 
(Courson, 2011: 29-30). When Alamieyeseigha decided to ally with the Northern-faction, he 
was arrested on corruption claims and replaced by Goodluck Jonathan in late 2005 (Stratfor, 
2009b). This was followed with the arrest of Ijaw banking magnate Chief Ebitimi Banigo and 
Dokubo-Asari within a few weeks. These arrests were largely perceived as an attack by 
Federal-government on the entire Ijaw ethnic-group (Courson, 2007: 33-34). 
 
In this political environment Odili reckoned he could make a crack at the 2007 Vice-
Presidency. However, as this would give Odili and the Igbos more power than the Ijaws could 
accept, Clark was forced to take action (Stratfor, 2009b). Although Clark no longer had 
Dokubo-Asari, he had his network. In the Tombia-axis were Dagogo and NDSF; in the 
Bayelsa-axis were bunkerer Ebikabowei Victor (aka. ‘Boyloaf’); in the Warri area were 
Tompolo and FNDIC; in Rivers were George and the Outlaws; and providing the weapons 
was arms-dealer Henry Okah. Even though Odili had Tom and the NDVS; Clark now had 
MEND (Stratfor, 2009c). 
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Chief Clark had long had aspirations for a kinsman in the Presidency (Stratfor, 2009b). This is 
reflected in MEND’s strategy of long-term institutional rent-seeking through ethnic 
representation in Federal-government, rather than short-term payoffs (Stratfor, 2009c). In 
order to show the Ijaws as a force to be reckoned with and undermine Obasanjo’s bid for re-
election, MEND initiated an intensive campaign of systems-disruptions intended to 
demonstrate the cost of having Obasanjo in power (Stratfor, 10/05/2007). Obasanjo reacted by 
calling for a total crackdown on militants and instructed JTF to use extreme force in 
protecting energy-infrastructure. In response MEND allied with NDPVF and COMA to form 
the JRC (Courson, 2007: 37-38). 
 
Despite Odili’s financial flow to PDP-patrons, the harm inflicted by MEND on the Nigerian 
economy forced PDP to select Clark’s ‘Godson’ Goodluck Jonathan as Vice-Presidential 
candidate. As Yar’Adua and Jonathan won the 2007 election, Ijaws finally had their man in 
Federal-government with direct influence over oil revenue management and access to 
significant patronage (Stratfor, 2009c). However, as a way to remind Jonathan who he owed 
his loyalty, MEND initiated a week of attacks after inauguration. MEND publicly exposed 
him as their political patron and warned that attacks would continue should he not provide 
them with sufficient income (Stratfor, 10/05/2007). 
 
The 2007 election involved rotations in the hierarchy of power in Nigerian and Niger-Deltan 
politics: Obasanjo entered the role of supreme ‘political godfather’ as the PDP National 
Chairman; Ibori’s cousin and also part of Clark’s patronage-network Emmanuel Uduaghan 
stepped in as Governor of Delta; and under pressure from central PDP patrons Timipre Sylva 
stepped in as Governor of Bayelsa. Rivers Governorship had initially gone to Celestine 
Omehia, but after his political rival Rotimi Amaechi had filed an appeal, the Nigerian 
Supreme Court annulled Omehia’s victory and emplaced Amaechi as Governor. Amaechi 
swore his loyalty to Clark which presumably had a hand in the belated victory (Stratfor, 
2009c). 
 
MEND had since March 2006 begun to show cracks and soon three factions emerged: 
Dagogo and the NDSF joined with George and the Outlaws to form ‘Eastern-MEND’ 
operating in Rivers; Boyloaf joined with Okah forming ‘Central-MEND’ operating in 
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Bayelsa; and managing to retain large parts of the original core, Tompolo and FNDIC formed 
‘Western-MEND’ operating in Delta. Whereas the two former factions were operating largely 
for politico-criminal objectives, ‘Western-MEND’ remained relatively more devoted to the 
struggle for ‘resource control’ and the release of Dokubo-Asari and Alamieyeseigha (Asuni, 
2009a: 19-20). 
 
Figure 9: Evolution of armed groups in the Niger-Delta, 1983-2007 
 
(Source: Hazen and Horner, 2007: 78) 
 
After the 2007 election the armed groups in the Niger-Delta soon became incorporated into 
the patronage-networks of national and local PDP-patrons (figure 10), and employed as 
political-enforcers (Stratfor, 2010a). After inauguration Yar’Adua had released Dokubo-
Asari, presumably to serve as a government proxy (Stratfor, 2009c). Udughan had set himself 
up as a political patron of ‘Western-MEND’ (FNDIC), paying Tompolo about N100 million 
per month (AC, 2009). In Bayelsa, Governor Sylva incorporated selected ‘Central-MEND’-
commanders into his patronage-network such as Boyloaf, Eris Paul and Africanus Ukparasia 
Tuwonwei (aka. ‘General Africa’) (AC, 2010a; Hansen and Steffen, 2011). Rivers Governor 
Amaechi incorporated ‘Eastern-MEND’ (Outlaws) and NDVS into his patronage-network 
(Stratfor, 22/04/2011). 
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Figure 10: Hierarchy of Niger-Delta Politics after the 2007 Elections 
 
(Source: Stratfor, 2010b) 
 
Nevertheless, after Federal-government arrested Henry Okah in 2007, MEND initiated 
campaign ‘Hurricane Barbarosa’ and ‘Hurricane Obama’ by conducting systems-disruptions 
across the Niger-Delta (Courson, 2011: 34-35). The escalation of attacks (graph 4) cut 
Nigerian oil production by about 900,000 bpd (nearly 25% of total production) in 2008, 
helping to push oil prices above $145 bpd. Attacks at SPDC’s infrastructure at Forcados cut 
production by 164,000 bpd and at EA field by 115,000 bpd. On June 19
th
 MEND made an 
escalation of violence through the first significant attack on offshore infrastructure by 
attacking SPDC’s Bonga platform, shutting production by 225,000 bpd (Daly, 2008). 
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Graph 4: Militancy in the Niger-Delta 2000-2010 
 
(START, 2011) 
 
By early 2009 ‘Western-MEND’ remained the only highly active MEND faction with at least 
five bases in Gbaramatu territory, including the renowned ‘Camp 5’. After weeks of attacks 
on both military and energy-infrastructure targets, the government responded with a massive 
military mobilization in a hunt for Tompolo and ‘Western-MEND’ (map 6). MEND retaliated 
by considerable campaigns of systems-disruptions, cutting Nigeria’s oil production by 0.8 
million bpd (AC, 2009; Courson, 2011: 35-36). It has been suggested that the real incentives 
behind the military attack was to was to subdue Udughan and ‘Western-MEND’ which were 
becoming too independent and powerful (Stratfor, 2009d). 
 
Map 6: Armed conflict between MEND and JTF, May 2009 
 
(Source: AC, 2009) 
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Amnesty and its Discontents 
The increased level of violence forced Federal-government to initiate the Amnesty program in 
June 2009, where unconditional pardon was given in exchange for disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR). The program came after negotiations between local 
political elites and militia leaders. It was accepted by some MEND-factions, but refused by 
others until the release of incarcerated militants such as Okah (Obi and Rustad, 2011: 203-
204). The underlying agenda of the program was presumably to incorporate militants into the 
PDP patronage-network (Stratfor, 2009f), much like Babangida’s ‘policy of settlement’. 
 
As of 2011, the program have been joined by 26,358 militants (Francis et al., 2011: 17), 
including Ateke Tom, Tompolo, Dagogo, and Boyloaf among others (Stratfor, 2009f). This 
freed up hundreds of thousands of barrels shut-in by systems-disruptions and allowed a 
resumption of oil production at 2 million bpd (Stratfor, 2010e). However, as most of the 
patronage accumulated with militia-commanders, disgruntled foot-soldiers abandoned camps 
or rioted (Obi and Rustad, 2011: 205). Henry Okah warned that no matter how many 
commanders accepted the Amnesty, there were others to take their place (Stratfor, 2010e). On 
March 15
th
 2010, ‘Central-MEND’ therefore conducted a bomb attack on the Amnesty talks 
in Warri (Stratfor, 2010d).  
 
Disgruntled commanders in ‘Western-MEND’ went on to establish the ‘Niger-Delta 
Liberation Force’ (NDLF) in late 2010 (Stratfor, 2011a). NDLF was composed of anti-
Amnesty militants under the leadership of John Togo, and based in the Ayakoromo 
community in Delta State. They became involved in bunkering and systems-disruptions, 
issuing threats under the name ‘Mark Anthony’ (Francis et al., 2011: 130). However, as JTF 
were ordered to attack any militia outside the patronage-networks of the political patrons in 
government, NDLF came under heavy military attack (Stratfor, 2010e). 
 
The strategy largely incapacitated anti-Amnesty militia-commander, as Sobama George was 
killed in August 2010, Henry Okah was jailed in South-African in October (Stratfor, 2011c; 
Stratfor, 2011d), and John Togo was killed in May 2011 (Francis et al., 2011: 130). Despite 
the sporadic violence that continued into 2010 and 2011, it was nowhere near the levels 
between 2006 and 2009 (McNamee, 2012). However, by late 2010 many militants had 
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become disgruntled with Amnesty and turned to piracy to cut their financial losses (Hansen 
and Steffen, 2011). 
 
Political Enforcement for the 2011 Elections 
Although MEND has its origins in the agitations for Ijaw ‘resource control’, by 2010 most 
MEND-factions owed loyalty to a hierarchical patronage-network reaching PDP-factions at 
the national level. Despite their relative autonomy, they would be expected to operate as 
political-enforcers for top-level PDP-patrons (Stratfor, 2010a). As Lagos since 1999 have 
been firmly under AD control, with an annual GDP of about $34 billion and a State budget of 
about $2.7 billion, it is the most affluent State outside PDP control. When MEND on July 12
th
 
2009 conducted a damaging attack on ‘Atlas Cove’ oil jetty in Lagos, it could be perceived as 
a PDP attempt to discourage AD before the 2011 State election through systems-disruptions 
(Stratfor, 2009e). 
 
Given PDP’s political predominance, government elections are basically determined in the 
PDP primaries. As Jonathan stepped in as President after Yar’Adua death, he had the 2011 
Presidential election less than a year ahead (Stratfor, 2011b). The 2011 primaries were to be 
another competition between Southern and Northern PDP-factions, with Jonathan and 
Babangida as opposing candidates. When MEND claimed responsibility for a bomb-attack in 
Abuja during the Independence Day celebrations on October 1
st
, Henry Okah was re-arrested 
along with Raymond Dokpesi, Babangida’s campaign manager. This is an indication that the 
attack was perpetrated by ‘Central-MEND’ as political-enforcement for the Northern PDP-
faction (Stratfor, 2010d). The Northern-faction has also been suspected of engaging NDLF as 
a way of undermining Jonathan’s Presidency (AC, 2010b).  
 
In January 2011, Jonathan won an overwhelming victory in the PDP primaries (Stratfor, 
2011b). However, as this disregarded the rotation-system, the Presidential election triggered 
ethno-religious communal conflict in Northern Nigeria (Francis et al., 2011: 60-61). 
Subsequently, since late 2011 Northern Nigeria has experienced increased violence by 
Muslim militia ‘Boko-Haram’, suggested to be acting as political-enforcers for Northern 
political patrons (Bøås, 2012: 2-4). ‘Boko-Haram’ is believed to have links with senior 
security officers associated with the Abacha-regime, such as Zakari Biu and Hamza al-
Mustapha among others (AC, 2012a). 
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A New Rentier-Elite? 
After becoming President, Jonathan has made efforts to further extend and reinforce his 
patronage-network in anticipation of the 2015 election. In 2012 Jonathan halved the popular 
fuel subsidy and freed up oil revenues to be spent on public utilities. This allows him to award 
public procurement contracts to his patronage-network, as a way of channeling oil rent away 
from the traditional rentier-elite to a new rentier-elite (Stratfor, 2012a). Logically it would 
also increase fuel demands and raise the price on bunkered oil, further contributing to the 
coffers of the Niger-Delta elite. The presence of ethnic-patronage became evident in the 2011 
public expenditure budget, as the Niger-Delta was home to 86% of the public investment 
projects (Abdallah, 2011). 
 
Jonathan has also made moves to reform the oil revenue management process by proposing a 
‘Petroleum Industry Bill’ (PIB) that would free NNPC from public budgeting by privatizing 
it. However, this would give Jonathan the opportunity to award licenses and key positions in 
the industry to his patronage-network and shift the power base of the traditional rentier-elite 
(Stratfor, 2011e). Furthermore, the proposed replacement of the ECA with a ‘Sovereign 
Wealth Fund’ under Presidential control, would give Jonathan increased capacity for 
patronage and allow him to extend his control over States/LGAs (Stratfor, 2012a).  
 
Jonathan has also made moves to reinforce his patronage-network by emplacing more loyal 
clients. By backing him in the PDP Bayelsa State primaries, Jonathan was able to replace 
Governor Sylva with more loyal Henry Seriake Dickson. Furthermore, Jonathan also used his 
influence to get his client Alhaji Bamanga Tukur elected as PDP National Chairman (AC, 
2012b). Being a Northern Muslim, it has been suggested that the selection of Tukur was not 
only an effort to extend his control within the PDP, but also to neutralize Northern claims to 
the rotation-system for the 2015 election (Egburonu and Akowe, 2012). 
 
Jonathan also seems to be bringing militants directly into his patronage-network and utilizing 
them as political-enforcers. Jonathan has sidestepped Governor Udughan by integrating 
Tompolo directly into his patronage-network through awarding him procurement contracts 
(AC, 2011b). Tompolo’s company ‘Messrs Global West Vessel Specialist Nigeria Limited’ 
was recently awarded a N15 billion government contract (Yemoja News, 2012). Furthermore, 
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when popular protests broke out against the fuel-subsidy cut, Dokubo-Asari was employed to 
harass and threaten the labour-unions (SaharaReporters, 2012). 
 
A Shift in Conflict Risk-Events? 
Despite extending his control in the Niger-Delta, Jonathan still faces political and militant 
opposition. As the first attack since November 2010, anti-Amnesty MEND-factions resumed 
systems-disruptions by targeting a Bayelsa trunk-line. ‘Jomo Gbomo’ announced that “rather 
than address serious issues facing the nation and its citizens, Goodluck Jonathan squanders 
public funds on tribalistic sycophants and thugs calling themselves ex-militants”. 
Nevertheless, as key commanders have been pacified by Amnesty, remaining MEND-factions 
are unable to conduct any well-organized campaigns (McNamee, 2012). 
 
MEND also claimed responsibility for other attacks. In February 2012 a ship anchored outside 
Port-Harcourt was attacked and the crew kidnapped, and in March seaborne militants attacked 
a JTF convoy killing four soldiers outside Brass. Same day, four policemen were killed in 
Nembe, and two Eni pipelines blew up in Brass. However, these attacks were presumably 
conducted by a faction associated with pirate warlord Shedrack Itokofuwei (aka. ‘Mammy 
Water’) on orders from deposed Governor Sylva, which is determined to retain a role in 
Niger-Delta politics (AC, 2012a). 
 
After being approached by militant clients frustrated with inadequacies of Amnesty, Clark 
reportedly felt that Jonathan had neglected the Ijaw cause resulting in a ‘Cold War’ between 
them (Ibrahim, 2012). Nevertheless on May 25
th
 2012, Clark declared his support for 
Jonathan in the 2015 Presidential elections, which could mean a reconstitution of MEND as 
political-enforcers in a campaign of systems-disruptions to coerce the PDP into re-electing 
Jonathan (Stratfor, 2012b). 
 
Although the militancy in the Niger-Delta has dramatically reduced, Northern- and Middle-
Nigeria is facing increasing ethno-religious conflict. This has not spread to the Niger-Delta, 
which is currently experiencing renewed stability. However, both piracy and bunkering is on 
the rise. A Shell official recently stated that “Shell is probably losing more oil now than 
during the Delta insurgency (sited in Giroux, 07/05/2012).” An estimated 43,000 bpd is being 
bunkered from SPDC operations (Shell, 14/05/2012). 
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6.3 Risk-Factors Causing Conflict Risk to E&P 
Operations 
Exploring how we can best analyse political risk to E&P operations in areas of armed conflict 
we have found that basing the analysis on a causal variable representing the actors’ choices 
and a causal variable representing the structural environment they’re operating within, we 
were able to examine the conflict risk-events both as the outcome of the actors’ strategies and 
as the product of the structural characteristics of the environment the actors are operating 
within. 
 
Analyzing conflict risk-events as the outcome of the risk-actors’ strategic choices we found 
that ethnic-militias and local communities target the national economy through systems-
disruptions as part of a 4GW strategy. In the Niger-Delta, attacks on energy-infrastructure can 
be explained as a way of harming the national economy as a way of transmitting a ‘message’ 
to the oil companies and the Nigerian government that it is the locals that hosts the E&P 
operations in the Niger-Delta, and not the Federal-government. 
 
Analyzing conflict risk-events as the product of the structural environment risk-actors are 
operating within, we found that economic structures combined with pre-modern social 
structures produced rent-seeking competition between social groups resulting in armed 
conflict. In Nigeria, the oil industry has created a ‘resource curse’ where the misappropriation 
of public resources, handouts from oil companies, and criminal activities has become primary 
ways of generating wealth. This has resulted in an intense competition for oil rent between 
communities, clans, and ethnic-groups at both the local and national level.  
 
At the local level, risk-actors violently clash over access to oil rent or extort it off oil 
companies. At the national level, militants will coerce Federal-government to allow into 
kinsmen public positions as a way of securing the allocation of public resources. Basing the 
analysis on our causal model, the study will go on to examine the risk management strategies 
E&P companies use in order to manage conflict risk. 
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7 Risk Management 
This chapter provides our analysis with an exploration of the effect of the strategies 
companies use to manage risk to E&P operations in areas of armed conflict, contributing with 
an influential exogenous variable. The last variable under analysis is the effect of risk 
management strategies. Political risk management (PRM) is the sum of the possible actions 
companies can take in order to keep the political risks involved with operations at a tolerable 
level (Brink, 2004: 149). PRM strategies are meant to translate the intelligence provided by 
the political risk analysis into action (McKellar, 2010: 118-119), and should therefore be 
tailored to the particularities surrounding the operation (Lax, 1981: 177).  
7.1 Managing Political Risk 
There are four broad categories of risk management strategies, which should be selected or 
combined on the basis of costs, benefits, effectiveness, and other relevant criteria. The first is 
to simply avoid the risk (Cortez, 2010: 140-141). Although, companies will often avoid or 
withdraw from the operating environment when faced with armed conflicts, E&P companies 
do not have the luxury of relocating as they are bound to operate where there are oil reserves 
and their assets are located (Maresca, 2004: 123-124). 
 
The second is to transfer the risk to another company by using derivatives, outsourcing, or 
insuring, (Cortez, 2010: 142-143). By sharing financial losses with other stakeholders, risk is 
kept at a tolerable level. Derivatives are made by involving operation financiers or entering 
cost sharing contracts with the host-government, like a ‘Production Sharing Contracts’ 
(McKellar, 2010: 141-143). More common is obtaining political risk insurance like OPIC or 
MIGA (Brink, 2004: 163). However, most conflict risk insurance has very high premiums or 
very restrictive coverage (often not covering risk-events generated by non-state actors) 
(Crossin and Banfield, 2006: 15).  
 
The third is to reduce the impact of risk by focusing on the consequences of potential risk-
events (Cortez, 2010: 144). This can be done by developing contingency- and business 
continuity plans (Bremmer and Keat, 2009: 194). These are preparation plans contingent on 
particular risk-events materializing, such as ‘Hazardous Environment Awareness Training’ 
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(HEAT) (McKellar, 2010: 120, 131). However, such strategies are reactive emphasizing 
damage-control. Political risks tend to be much easier to handle before they materialize. In 
risk management “…an ounce of prevention is certainly worth a pound of cure (Zonis and 
Wilkin, 2001: 178).” 
 
Finally, one may reduce the probability of risk by identifying the possible risk-events and 
attempting to reduce their potential of occurring (Cortez, 2010: 140-144). By focusing efforts 
on the risk-factors causing them, one can reduce the probability of the risk-events 
materializing (Kytle and Ruggie, 2005: 5). Key to such proactive PRM strategies is a 
comprehensive and systematic analysis of the risk-factors involved (Zonis and Wilkin, 2001: 
178). As this is the only category of risk management that has any influence on the risk-
events, it is the only management strategy that will be included in our analysis as an 
exogenous variable. 
7.2 Proactive Risk Management Strategies 
Political risk management (PRM) strategies tend to be drafted into an independent policy 
which guides the company through the political risk by applying suitable organizational 
principles and techniques (Brink, 2004: 164-165). PRM strategies can be dichotomized into 
protective and integrative management strategies. Protective strategies are meant to protect 
the company’s assets from the risk-events. Integrative strategies are meant to allow the 
company to influence relations with stakeholders (Brink, 2004: 156). 
7.2.1 Protective Risk Management Strategies 
Companies must maintain a basic degree of physical security in order to protect assets like 
personnel and infrastructure. The security provisions should be tailored to meet the 
requirements of the particular operating environment (McKellar, 2010: 125-126). Protection 
of oil personnel, onshore/offshore infrastructure, tankers and pipelines can be provided by the 
host-state’s security forces or ‘private security companies’ (PSC) (Maresca, 2004: 125). Oil 
companies have also turned to the host-communities for protection in the provision of 
‘community-based security’. This has been done by Shell, Mobil and Chevron in the Niger-
Delta (Allen, 2009: 47), and by BP in Tangguh, Indonesia (Shelley, 2005: 61).  
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However, an excessive reliance on security measures can in fact increase the risk as it often 
incurs animosity towards the company from local communities. It may also harm a 
company’s international reputation for being unwilling to engage constructively with local 
communities (McKellar, 2010: 127). Companies will also suffer reputational harm if security 
forces and PSCs become involved in human-rights abuses. As PSCs are service providers 
companies may simply stop doing business with them, but this becomes much more 
complicated when it is the host-state that is behind such abuses (Maresca, 2004: 125-126). 
7.2.2 Integrative Risk Management Strategies 
An often overlooked, yet vital risk management strategy is building relationships with key 
actors (McKellar, 2010: 132). However, relationship-building should be carefully balanced 
with protective strategies, so as not to exacerbate the physical risk yet avoiding potential 
reputational harm (McKellar, 2010: 128). Relationship-building should be done by gaining 
acceptance from key stakeholders by trying to engage them through communication and 
consultation (McKellar, 2010: 134-135). This is done by involving stakeholders to a varying 
degree into the decision making process; from informing or consulting them on decisions, to 
letting them influence the decision-making (Kytle and Ruggie, 2005: 10).  
 
As the host-government is responsible for the overall political, legal, and to a degree the 
social environments in which oil companies operate, the most important stakeholder is the 
host-government. Antagonizing the host-government could mean an expiration of their 
operating license. Nevertheless, excessively close affiliations may involve reputational harm 
as companies become associated with government corruption, human-rights abuses, and oil 
revenue mismanagement. The same is true for engagement with local administrative units 
(Bray, 2003: 314-317). 
 
As they often hold the de-facto power in areas of operation, local communities are also 
crucially important stakeholders. In E&P operation it is essential to obtain approval (‘social 
license’) from and maintain good relations (‘community-relations’) with host-communities. 
An inability to constructively engage host-communities have often led to a violent response. 
Subsequently, companies will have to take all local communities with genuine entitlements 
into concern. However, it can be difficult to distinguish which communities have rights to the 
land on which E&P companies operate. Customary land rights may not be registered and 
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informal ownership will often be held by the community/clan as a whole (Bray, 2003: 317-
318).  
 
As a way of gaining acceptance from stakeholders within civil society and the international 
community, companies should the very least comply with laws and regulations as well as try 
to uphold certain global ethical standards. Beyond this, companies should also maintain 
consultation with civil society actors like NGOs, development agencies, international 
institutions etc, without allowing them to excessively dominate corporate decisions 
(McKellar, 2010: 134-136). 
 
Efforts of relationship-building can be incorporated into a strategy of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) (Kytle and Ruggie, 2005: 9-15; McKellar, 2010: 136-137). CSR 
involves an extra-legal corporate responsibility for their operations and subcontractors, as 
well as a responsibility to manage relations with the host-society (Frynas, 2009: 6). The oil 
industry have commonly approached CSR through impact assessments and consultations; 
participating in ‘tri-sectoral’ partnerships with governments and NGOs on specific issues; and 
participating in initiatives aimed at preventing the ‘oil curse’ by for example encouraging 
revenue management programs and development-orientated investment programs 
(Shankleman, 2006: 60-62).  
 
The oil sector, in particular Shell and BP, has taken a leading role in championing CSR. 
Nevertheless, it was largely in response to international media attention and political 
pressures due to the visible adverse impact of the industry, such as the ‘Exxon Valdez’ oil 
spill, human-rights abuses in Colombia, and anti-Shell protests in Nigeria (Frynas, 2009: 6), 
For Shell this reached a culmination point with the execution of Ken Saro-Wiva (Shankleman, 
2006: 58-59). CSR initiatives in the oil industry can therefore largely be perceived as a 
strategy of managing reputational risk by providing immunization against public criticism and 
insulation against public scrutiny (Levenstein and Wooding, 2005: 6-11).  
 
Despite the need, most corporations operating in areas of armed conflict seem hesitant in 
engaging in CSR initiatives addressing peace and security (Deitelhoff and Wolf, 2010: 6). In 
the oil industry there has been a relatively greater interest in conflict prevention and peace-
building, but largely in a strictly operationally relevant manner (Shankleman, 2006: 68). 
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Nevertheless, much like CSR initiatives on environmental, health, educational and human-
rights issues, corporate initiatives on peace and security can be incorporated into a strategy of 
Corporate Security Responsibility (CSecR) (Deitelhoff and Wolf, 2010: 9).  
 
CSecR initiatives “directly or indirectly address the level of violence in an environment 
characterized by imminent, ongoing, or only very recently terminated interactions of physical 
violence (Deitelhoff and Wolf, 2010: 13).” Direct initiatives address immediate causes of 
conflict through contributions to DDR, peace negotiations, and management of security forces 
or PSC. Indirect initiatives address root causes of conflict through contributions on socio-
economic, political, and socio-cultural issues etc (Deitelhoff and Wolf, 2010: 13-15).  
7.3 SPDC’s Conflict Risk Management Strategies in 
the Niger-Delta 
Although not making official reference to risk management (PRM), Shell operates with a 
policy framework that involves a range of social issues, including business ethics, health, 
environment, human-rights, sustainable development, community participation, and security 
(Omeje, 2006a: 77). These initiatives will however be analysed as risk management 
strategies, as they fall inn under the PRM strategies listed above and directly or indirectly 
address the conflict risk Shell is facing in the Niger-Delta 
7.3.1 Managing Security 
Oil companies operating in joint venture with NNPC are provided security by the Nigerian 
government, however security forces are often inefficient, underpaid, poorly trained, and 
underequipped (Francis et al., 2011: 62). SPDC’s involvement in security governance has 
therefore developed parallel with the Nigerian government’s inability in providing sufficient 
security to their operations (Zimmer, 2010: 74). Faced with increased conflict risk to 
operations in 18 countries, Shell in 2001 formalized explicit guidelines for the provision of 
private or public security for the specific purpose of protecting personnel and energy-
infrastructure (Omeje, 2006a: 77-78). 
 
As the Nigerian legal framework initially disallowed the use of armed PSCs, SPDC employed 
the semi-private ‘Supernumerary Police’ (or ‘Spy Police’) to provide protection in 
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conjunction with security forces. These are police forces provided by the Nigerian 
government, but funded by SPDC. In 2006 SPDC employed about 700 Spy officers with 
responsibilities largely restricted to internal security, like access-control to facilities (Omeje, 
2006a: 79). The ‘Spy Police’ is by law prohibited from carrying arms, but has tended to do so 
on ‘escort duty’. SPDC has also operated with a network of plainclothes informants (Amunwa 
and Mikio, 2011: 12). SPDC’s informant network is so vast it has been revealed to have 
infiltrated every key Nigerian ministry (Reuters, 2010). 
 
For the protection of energy-infrastructure and personnel, SPDC largely depends on 
government security forces like JTF. Although these are provided by the Nigerian 
government, SPDC is expected to provide logistics, transportation, and allowances for 
officers assigned to their protection (Omeje, 2006a: 80). Also assigned to the protection of 
SPDC assets is the paramilitary arm of the Nigerian police, known as the ‘Mobile Police’ (or 
‘MoPol’; ‘kill-and-go’) (Amunwa and Mikio, 2011: 12). However, from 2010 the NCA has 
allowed foreign companies to outsource security provision contracts to Nigerian PSCs 
(Francis et al., 2011: 63). 
 
During the non-violent struggles in the 1990s, SPDC provided financial and other types of 
support to key politicians and Nigerian security forces to quell protests (Allen, 2009: 50; 
Ibeanu and Luckham, 2007: 70-71; Zimmer, 2010: 65). In Ogoniland, SPDC provided 
assistance and encouraged military attacks on protesting communities (Amunwa and Mikio, 
2011: 12). Not only did the massive human-rights abuses end up militarizing the protest 
movement (Allen, 2009: 50-51), it also (particularly the execution of Saro-Wiwa) caused 
SPDC massive reputational harm which forced Shell into transforming its security policy 
(Ibeanu and Luckham, 2007: 71).  
 
In partnership with US and UK governments, as well as several other oil companies, Shell 
participated in developing the ‘Voluntary Principles on Security and Human-rights’ (VPSHR) 
(Zimmer, 2010: 65). The VPSHR sets guidelines on preventing company complicity with 
human-rights abuses by host-governments or PSCs providing security (McKellar, 2010: 128; 
Maresca, 2004: 126). The VPSHR safeguards human-rights by shaping security management 
in accordance with international law, by excluding individuals previously implicated in 
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abuses, by explicating restrictions on rules of engagement, and by providing transparency and 
public consultations on security arrangements (Shankleman, 2006: 64). 
 
By including the VPSHR into its security policy and making efforts to implement it in 
Nigeria, SPDC has shown a dedication to CSecR (Zimmer, 2010: 65-66). Since 2007, SPDC 
has provided training on conflict resolution and human-rights for security contractors and 
‘Spy-officers’. In 2011, SPDC also provided 67 VPSHR briefings to security forces and PSCs 
(Shell, 2012b). However, although VPSHR has been discussed with Federal-government, it 
has yet to be systematically implemented into the Nigerian security forces (Zimmer, 2010: 65-
66). In fact, there has been reports of human-rights abuses by security forces in protection of 
SPDC energy-infrastructure as recently as in 2010 (Amunwa and Mikio, 2011: 52). 
 
Less officially, SPDC has also relied on community-based security for the protection of 
energy-infrastructure and personnel through ‘security contracts’ (known as ‘Surveillance 
contracts’) with armed groups and community-militias (Allen, 2009: 47; Amunwa and Mikio, 
2011: 27; Omeje, 2006a: 90-91). As of 2011, SPDC reportedly employed about 9.000 
militants under temporary ‘security contracts’ (Amunwa and Mikio, 2011: 27). Contracts 
have been semi-formal and wages have often depended on performance. SPDC has also paid 
‘stay-at-home’ money to pacify potentially militant youth (Omeje, 2006a: 91).  
 
Such community-based security is implicitly permitted by the VPSHR (Amunwa and Mikio, 
2011: 27; Zalik, 2011: 189), and has allowed oil companies to become less reliant on 
government protection. SPDC has relied on community-based security for operations in 
Nembe (Bayelsa), Edagberi (Rivers), and other sites in Bayelsa, Rivers and Delta States. 
Paradoxically though, security has often been provided by the very armed groups belonging to 
MEND (Allen 2009: 45). Furthermore, the strategy has created a backlash as it incentivises 
attacks on assets in extortion for contracts (Allen, 2009: 47), induces armed conflict in the 
inter-community competition for contracts (Watts, 2007: 651), and induces armed conflict 
and attacks by altering the internal power-balance within communities (Omeje, 2006a: 92). 
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7.3.2 Managing Host-Communities 
When operations began in 1956, SPDC’s community-relations strategy was the ‘community-
assistance’ approach where one-time contributions would be given to host-communities in 
order to keep them compliant (Idemudia, 2011: 169). SPDC would enter a ‘Memoranda of 
Understanding’ (MoU) with the host-community, were community compliance was rewarded 
with some sort of benefit. This strategy managed to pacify initially hostile communities, but it 
also incentivized hostility in extortion for MoUs and instigated intra/inter-community conflict 
over the competition of oil rents (Omeje, 2006a: 83-84). 
 
The reputational harm involved with the execution of Saro-Wiwa and the subsequent increase 
in community protest in the mid-1990s, pushed SPDC to completely transform their 
community-relations strategy and CSR was recognized as a vital risk management strategy for 
continued oil operations in the Niger-Delta (Frynas, 2009: 21-23; Idemudia, 2011: 169-170). 
In 1997, this resulted in a ‘community-development’ approach were SPDC would enter a 
MoU with the host-community, but also involve a number of NGOs in a ‘tri-sectoral’ 
partnership. This involved a higher degree of engagement as stakeholders trilaterally (SPDC-
community-NGO) would construct comprehensive development programmes (Omeje, 2006a: 
84-85). However, the community-development strategy was unable to dis-incentivise 
systems-disruptions (Omeje, 2006a: 90), or discourage intra/inter-community conflict 
(Idemudia, 2011: 170). 
 
In 2003, SPDC introduced the ‘sustainable community-development’ approach by further 
involving the Nigerian government and by transferring cost intensive projects to NDDC. 
However, the conflict environment did not alter much (Omeje, 2006a: 87). Nevertheless in 
2006, SPDC introduced ‘Global Memorandum of Understanding’ (GMoU) approach (Zalik, 
2011: 189). Instead of several bilateral MoUs, the GMoU employed a multilateral agreement 
between SPDC and a cluster of several host-communities (figure 11) (Shell, 2012c). As the 
cluster-members enter an intra- and inter-community contract, where benefits are contingent 
on their ability of ensuring a ‘non-conflictual’ operating environment, it is effective in de-
incentivizing systems-disruptions and discouraging intra/inter-community conflict (Zalik, 
2011: 190-191). The GMoU approach can be considered a CSecR as it both directly and 
indirectly address the armed conflict. 
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Figure 11: SPDC’s GMoU  
 
(Source: Shell, 2012c) 
 
Each cluster involves the SPDC, host-communities, NGOs, LGAs, and State Governments 
into the decision-making process under the Cluster Development Board. The cluster joins 
communities along clan affiliations or LGAs (Shell, 2012c). However, in many circumstances 
large parts of the relevant clan has been left out of the cluster (Zalik, 2011: 191). In Rivers 
State, a disagreement erupted between SPDC and the Rumuokwurusi community of the Obio-
Akpor LGA, as the community felt that three-quarters of their clan was not being represented 
in the cluster (Onah, 2011). 
 
Although SPDC by 2010 had entered GMoUs with 27 clusters covering 290 communities 
consisting of about 30% of their host-communities (Shell, 2012c), they seem to have 
overlooked clans and communities key to the armed conflict in the Niger-Delta. As of 2007, 
none of the communities in the Gbaramatu clan had been included into a MoU/GMoU with 
SPDC, despite hosting several SPDC infrastructures such the Jones Creek flow-station and 
the Egwa I and Ewa II flow-stations (Courson, 2007: 13-14). 
 
As “any disruption” to operations is considered a breach of contract, the GMoU system 
criminalizes both violent and non-violent community protest (Zalik, 2011: 198). However, it 
seems as if local communities have managed to bypass this by mobilizing the entire cluster 
when protesting the SPDC. In 2011, the ‘Association of Basan West, Iduwini, Kou and Mein 
Cluster Development Boards and Foundations’ threatened SPDC to shut down the E.A. Field 
(Bayelsa) in reaction to breaches of the GMoU-contract (Oyadongha, 2011a). More recently, 
the ‘Kolo Creek Cluster’ (Bayelsa) collectively disrupted operations at SPDC’s ‘Kolo Creek 
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Logistics Base’ and threatened to seize it if not demands for electricity supply was met 
(Oyadongha, 2011b). 
7.3.3 Managing Oil Revenues 
By employing indirect CSecR initiatives, SPDC has made efforts of addressing one of the 
major causes of conflict through initiatives aimed at the revenue management process. Shell 
has developed effective anti-corruption policies and their operations in Nigeria has by 
‘Transparency International’ been ranked as “very high above country average scores” in 
terms of corporate transparency. Shell is also a supporter of the ‘Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative’ (EITI) (Zimmer, 2010: 67-68). EITI is a voluntary ‘tri-sectoral’ 
initiative aimed at increasing transparency of the entire oil revenue management process. 
Increasing transparency is intended to allow civil-society to hold governments accountable as 
a way of discouraging revenue misappropriation (Shankleman, 2006: 64). Supporting EITI is 
an easy and inexpensive CSecR initiative (Zimmer, 2010: 68). 
 
In 2003 Nigeria was the first country to implement EITI, in the form of the ‘Nigerian 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative’ (NEITI). The initiative is governed and 
supervised by the ‘National Stakeholder Working Group’, co-chaired by SPDC (Zimmer, 
2010: 67). NEITI has commissioned several comprehensive audits of the oil industry, and 
made remediation plans based on the conclusions. However, remediation has so far been 
largely ineffective. Nevertheless, by passing the NEITI Act in 2007, Nigeria was the first 
country to create a legal framework for the implementation of EITI’s principles (Gboyega et 
al, 2011: 37). This has increased the transparency of Federal-government’s budgeting and 
revenue allocations (Francis et al., 2011: 46). However, not only has it failed to extend the 
initiative to States/LGAs, it has been restricted revenue collection rather than revenue 
utilization (Idemudia, 2011: 180; Zimmer, 2010: 68). 
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7.4 Managing Conflict Risk to E&P Operations 
Exploring how we can best analyse political risk to E&P operations in areas of armed conflict 
we have found that analyzing risk management provides our causal analysis with an 
exogenous variable, allowing us to analyse how the risk affected companies can reciprocally 
influence the risk-events they’re exposed to. Adding this variable allows any political risk 
analyst to evaluate the influence of a company’s PRM strategies and adjust them accordingly. 
 
We found that the two primary strategies of political risk management used by companies are 
either meant to protect their assets from the risk-events, or meant to influence their 
relationship with the risk-actors by integrating them into the host-society. E&P companies are 
completely dependent on the protection of energy-infrastructure, normally provided by the 
host-government but also by private security companies or local communities. The problem 
with extensive reliance on protection is that it may incur animosity and reputational harm to 
the company, if the security providers conduct human-rights abuses in their mission. In the 
Niger-Delta, Shell has not only incurred massive reputational harm due to human-rights 
abuses, but also conflict risk-events directly related to the provision of community-based 
security. 
 
In addition to relying on protection, E&P companies are increasingly turning to PRM 
strategies of relationship-building with stakeholders such as government, local communities, 
and NGOs. This can be incorporated into CSR initiatives aimed at addressing the adverse 
impacts of E&P operations. For companies operating in areas of armed conflict, such 
initiatives can be tailored at addressing the causes of conflict through CSecR initiatives. In the 
Niger-Delta, SPDC has as a strategy of managing the conflict risk, made efforts of addressing 
the armed conflict through CSecR initiatives such as GMoU (aimed at managing relationships 
with the host-communities), NEITI (aimed at oil revenue management), and VPSHR (aimed 
at curtailing human-rights abuses by security providers).  
 
On the basis of the relationships between the variables in our analysis we will develop causal 
sequences linking the risk-events to the risk-actors, risk factors, and risk management. We 
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will also construct risk indicators, and forecast future risk to Shell’s E&P operations in the 
Niger-Delta. 
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8 Forecasting 
In this chapter we will on the basis of our analysis of conflict risk to Shell’s E&P operations 
in the Niger-Delta, we will develop causal sequences linking the particular risk-events to 
specific risk-actors, risk-factors, and risk management strategies. Next we will construct risk 
indicators that offer data on the exposure to risk and the potential of future conflict risk. 
Finally, we will forecast future conflict risk to Shell’s E&P operations in the Niger-Delta by 
creating particular contingencies and assess their plausibility of emerging accordingly. 
8.1 The Causal Sequences of Conflict Risk 
On the basis of the relationships between the variables in the analysis of conflict risk to 
Shell’s E&P operations in the Niger-Delta, we will develop causal sequences (table 8) where 
specific risk-events (dependent variable) is the causal product of the particular risk-factors 
(causal variables) with the causal effect being transmitted through particular risk-actors 
(intervening variable), and the risk management (PRM) employed by the affected company in 
response (exogenous variable). 
 
1) Targeting of energy-infrastructure (EI) (incl. kidnappings of oil personnel): 
From our analysis we can conclude that high-level targeting of energy-infrastructure has been 
part of a 4GW strategy by ethnic-militias to coerce Federal-government into paying greater 
revenue allocations or assigning ethnic-kinsmen to public posts, i.e. institutional rent-seeking. 
Examples include NDPVF’s campaign of systems-disruptions in 2004 and MEND’s 
campaign between 2006 to 2009. SPDC has managed such conflict risks by relying on 
protection by security forces and by CSecR initiatives such as NEITI addressing oil revenue 
management as a cause of conflict. It is unsure if support of EITI was a conscious move to 
manage the political risks, or if it has had any effect on the level of violence. 
 
However, low-level targeting has been conducted by local communities for the purpose of 
extorting rent off E&P companies, i.e. extra-institutional rent-seeking. Examples include the 
sabotage of SPDC’s energy-infrastructure by Nembe communities in Bayelsa to extort oil 
rent. SPDC has managed such conflict risks by relying on protection and CSecR initiatives 
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like GMoU addressing the root causes of economic development and creating disincentives 
for systems-disruptions. 
 
2) Bunkering/kidnappings/piracy:  
Bunkering, piracy and kidnapping has been conducted by local communities, ethnic-militias 
and cults for criminal objectives, i.e. extra-institutional rent-seeking. This has been managed 
solely by relying on protection. It is currently the most widespread conflict type of risk-event, 
but little has been done to address it in terms of risk management. 
 
3) Armed conflict:  
Armed conflict is a result of rent-seeking competition between and within local communities, 
ethnic-militias, and cults over political representation, host-community status, employment, 
bunkering territory etc., i.e. both institutional rent-seeking and extra-institutional rent-seeking. 
Examples include the armed conflict between the Soku/Elem-Sangama and the Oluasiri 
communities in Bayelsa, and between Ijaws and Itsekiris in Warri. Armed conflict is often a 
side-effect of risk management, such as giving ‘host-community’ status, ‘security-contracts’ 
etc. Not only has SPDC relied on protection strategies, but also CSecR initiatives such as 
GMoU which creates disincentives for armed conflict between communities. 
 
4) Protests/demonstrations/blockades:  
Protests, demonstrations and blockades were conducted by local communities to pressure or 
extort oil companies for host-community status, i.e. extra-institutional rent-seeking. As risk 
management strategy, SPDC has relied on protection and CSesR. By relying 
disproportionately on protection strategies, SPDC contributed to militarize protests in the 
1990s, consequently escalating the conflict risk to targeting of energy-infrastructure and 
political/legal campaigning. However, GMoUs has created disincentives for community 
protests, demonstrations and blockades. 
 
5) Political and legal campaigning:  
Political and legal campaigning were conducted by ethnic advocacy groups for oil company 
pay-outs and increased revenue allocations, i.e. both institutional rent-seeking and extra-
institutional rent-seeking. Only political and legal campaigning directly linked to the armed 
conflict are considered, such as campaigning in response to human-rights abuses but not in 
100 
 
response to pollution. MOSOP has so far been the most prominent risk-actor generating such 
risk. As PRM strategy SPDC has through CSecR initiatives, such as the VPSHR, attempted to 
insulate themselves from the reputational/legal harm caused by political/legal campaigning. 
 
Table 8: The causal sequence of conflict risk to Shell’s E&P operations in the Niger-Delta 
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8.2 The Risk Indicators 
Based on our causal analysis we will construct risk indicators that provide data on the 
exposure to conflict risk to E&P operations. Risk indicators should be able to indicate the 
presence of risk; be capable of being measured; be able to be monitored by conveying the 
actual risk; and able to forecast the risk (IOR, 2010: 5-7). We believe that the risk indicators 
presented here all meet these criteria.  
 
Indicator 1: Elections 
Due to the high stakes involved with institutional rent-seeking, Federal-
government/State/LGA elections become zero-sum games where election run-ups are 
characterized by political-enforcement by armed groups (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 6-7). 
Looking at Shell’s oil spill record caused by sabotage between 2002 and 2011, it seems that 
sabotage incidents has a tendency to spike during the run-up and the election years 
(2002/2003, 2006/2007, and 2010/2011) (table 9), this is also reflected in the Nigerian oil 
industry as a whole by the volume of oil shut-in, with spikes in the run-up and election years 
2002/2003 and 2006/2007 (table 10). 
 
Table 9: Shell oil spills caused by sabotage 2002-2011 (almost exclusively in Nigeria) 
 
(Source: Shell, 2011: 32) 
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Table 10: Amount of  
shut-in  oil 2000 - 2008 
 
(Source: Asuni, 2009b: 6) 
 
Hansen and Steffen (2011) suggest that government elections also functions as a good 
indicator for piracy in the Niger-Delta. The number of piracy incidents seemed to dip the 
years before the 2003 and 2007 elections, only to rebound beyond previous levels (graph 5). 
The explanation is that armed groups will be busy with political-enforcement in the election 
run-up, and after the elections piracy as rent-seeking activity resumes. This tendency is 
reflected in the amount of oil stolen from the Nigerian oil industry, with dips in amount of 
stolen oil the run-up and election years 2002/2003 and 2006/2007 (graph 6). 
 
Graph 5: Maritime security incidents in                   Graph 6: Amount of oil stolen 2002 - 2008 
Nigerian waters 1992-2010 
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(Source: Hansen and Steffen, 2011)                         (Source: Asuni, 2009b: 6) 
 
 
Indicator 2: Oil Prices 
Graph 5 also correlates with another indicator – oil prices (graph 7). Although piracy seems to 
correlate with oil prices, bunkering (graph 6) seems uncorrelated to oil prices. It has been 
argued that oil prices will reduce the conflict level due increased government capacity for 
patronage (Kaldor et al, 2007: 24). It has also been argued that oil prices will increase the 
conflict level due to the increased stakes of rent-seeking competition between militants (Dube 
and Vargas, 2008: 26-27).  
 
On the basis of our analysis we will propose that both arguments are right. Oil prices indicate 
conflict risk contingent on whether the militants’ ethnic -patrons (‘godfathers’) are in position 
or in opposition to government. On the basis of our analysis we can infer that when ethnic -
patrons are in opposition, high oil prices will give them financial capacity to employ militants 
as political-enforcers to coerce government into giving positions to them or their clients. This 
was witnessed when Clark utilized MEND to get his client Goodluck Jonathan into the Vice-
Presidency. This tendency is reflected in the correlation between oil prices (graph 7) and the 
conflict level in the Niger-Delta (graph 8). 
 
Graph 7: Oil prices 1986-2010 (the prices of Nigerian oil tends to be  
slightly higher than Brent, but follows much the same developments) 
 
(Source: Urstad, 2011: 21)  
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Graph 8: The conflict level in the Niger-Delta 1995-2010 
 
(START, 2011) 
 
 
Indicator 3: Ethnic patronage 
Although oil prices may increase the conflict level when ethnic-patrons are in opposition; 
when these patrons are in government position, high oil prices will lower the conflict level as 
they are compelled to finance extensive patronage of militants in order to prevent disrupting 
the flows of oil revenues to government. This was witnessed in Nigeria through Yar’Adua 
and Jonathan’s Amnesty program. Looking at the spot price for Bonny Light over the past 
five years (graph 9) we can see that oil prices have been increasing, despite the remarkably 
low conflict levels between November 2010 and February 2012 that was largely a result of 
the provision  of government patronage through the Amnesty program (McNamee, 2012). 
Jonathan’s recent ability to extend and reinforce his patronage-network, shows that high oil 
prices has allowed him to finance extensive patronage. 
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Graph 9: Spot prices for Bonny Light Sept. 2008 – May 2012 
 
(Source: Bloomberg L.P., 2012) 
 
In fact, when looking at the conflict level in the Niger-Delta between 2009 and 2010 (graph 
10), we see a vast reduction after the Amnesty program was introduced in June 2009. The 
increase in conflict in late 2010  was conducted by anti-Amnesty militias like ‘Central-
MEND’ and NDLF that were not incorporated into Jonathan’s network or belonged to rival 
patronage-networks. However, it has been suggested that ethnic patronage could be used to 
reconstitute MEND as political-enforcers for the 2015 election (Stratfor, 2012b), which 
means an interaction with indicator 1 (elections) to indicate an escalation of violence in the 
years 2014/2015. 
 
Graph 10: The conflict level in the Niger-Delta 2009-2010 
 
(START, 2011) 
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8.3 Future Contingencies 
Shell (2011) writes in its Sustainability Report 2011 that after the upsurge of militancy 
between 2006 and 2009, in 2011 SPDC was for the second year able to increase production 
by reactivating oil wells and infrastructure. They are however exposed to increased bunkering 
activities and subsequent spillage. The question remains, how are these conflict risks going to 
pan out in a five year perspective? 
 
Risk is often expressed as the product of probability times impact (risk = probability x 
impact) (Bremmer and Keat, 2009: 4, 16). ‘Impact’ refers to the immediate harm and the 
reverberating effects of a risk-event (McKellar, 2010: 98-99), and ‘probability’ refers to the 
likelihood of it occurring (Cortez, 2010: 105). The probability and impact of risk-events is 
often plotted into a two-dimensional ‘risk-matrix’ where the probability is presented on the x-
axis, and impact is presented on the y-axis. This facilitates forecasting as it allows risk to be 
prioritized according to ‘riskiness’ (Bremmer and Keat, 2009: 210; Cortez, 2010: 104-105). 
 
Based on the causal sequence of risk and the risk indicators we will estimate the conflict risk 
to SPDC’s operations in the Niger-Delta by the type of conflict risk-event. These will be 
estimated by the accumulated impact of the risk-events and not in terms of expected cost to 
SPDC’s operations (as it would be too difficult without extensive analysis of SPDC data). 
These types of risk-events will be estimated in terms of probability using calibrated 
probability estimates with a 10% margin-of-error consequently having a total probability 
range of 6% - 95% probabilities.  
 
Each type of risk-event will be placed into the risk-matrix of the conflict risk to SPDC’s 
operations in the Niger-Delta of the years 2012/2013 and 2014/2015. As oil prices are 
difficult to forecast we will make forecast in terms of ‘higher’ vs. ‘lower’ oil prices when 
relevant. 
 
1) Targeting of energy-infrastructure (EI) (incl. kidnappings of oil personnel):  
President Jonathan’s actions of strengthening his patronage-network indicate that he is likely 
to re-run for Presidency in the 2015 elections. In the short run this is not likely to result in any 
well-organized campaigns of systems-disruptions by ethnic-militias and MEND. However, in 
the run-up and election years 2014/2015 there is likelihood that MEND will be reconstituted 
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in support for Jonathan’s re-election. But it is unlikely to reach the extent of the campaign 
between 2006 and 2009 as this reduced oil revenues as much as 25% and would translate into 
dramatically cutting the oil rent accessible to Jonathan’s patronage-network. 
 
Local political patrons contesting Jonathan (such as Sylva) and the Northern-faction of PDP 
(if the link is taken into account), could mobilize ‘Central-MEND’ or other anti-Amnesty 
militants like NDLF to conduct systems-disruptions before the election. Furthermore, as only 
about 30% of SPDC’s host-communities are integrated into the GMoU, community-militias 
could conduct systems-disruption against SPDC to extort oil rent. However, neither scenario 
is likely to result in any well-organized campaigns; especially id oil prices are low. 
 
As a result for the years 2012/2013 we estimate a probability of on/offshore energy-
infrastructure (EI) (incl. personnel) at 66%-95% causing a low impact harm. In year 
2014/2015 we estimate a shift to a probability at 36%-65% causing medium impact harm. 
However, the macro risk for Nigeria is likely to increase as Boko Haram is expected to 
escalate the violence, but is unlikely to affect the micro risk to SPDC’s operations in the 
Niger-Delta. 
 
2) Bunkering/kidnappings/piracy:  
Although kidnappings, at least for SPDC’s part have reduced over the past few years, 
bunkering and piracy has drastically been on the increase. As long as it remains such a 
massive industry with stakes held by local rentier-elites, it is unlikely that the Nigerian 
government is going to do much to manage it. So far there has been little SPDC can do but 
continue repairing damages on their infrastructure. Furthermore, Jonathan’s cut of fuel-
subsidies is likely to increase the market share of bunkered oil, and piracies are likely to 
fluctuate in correlation with oil prices. However, in the run-up and election years 2014/2015 it 
is unlikely that bunkering and piracies will remain this widespread as militias will be busy 
with political-enforcement. 
 
As a result for the years 2012/2013 we estimate a probability of bunkering/kidnappings/piracy 
at 66%-95% causing high impact. In year 2014/2015 we estimate a shift to a probability at 
6%-35% causing high impact harm. 
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3) Armed conflict:  
Inter/intra-community and ethnic conflict is likely to reduce as an increasing number of host-
communities are incorporated into a GMoU. Nevertheless, as only about 30% of the host-
communities in SPDC’s areas of operations are incorporated there is some likelihood of 
armed conflict, particularly with increased oil prices. Furthermore, in 2014/2015 there is also 
an increased likelihood of conflict between armed groups acting as enforcers for incumbent 
Governors and rival candidates. However, as Jonathan is managing to solidify his patronage-
network in the Niger-Delta, his Governor clients are less likely to be faced by any serious 
challengers and the levels of conflict is unlikely to reach the levels of past elections. 
 
As a result for the years 2012/2013 we estimate a probability of armed conflict at 66%-95% 
causing low impact. In year 2014/2015 we estimate a shift to a probability at 36%-65% (with 
much higher oil prices we estimate a probability at 66%-95%) causing medium impact harm. 
 
4) Protests/demonstrations/blockades:  
Although the GMoU may at face value have managed to quell community agitation, SPDC 
have been targeted by host-communities within the GMoU when not complying with contract 
obligations, often by entire clusters. With Ijaws in government such protests are likely to be 
tacitly tolerated by government as it would shift the costs of public utilities from government 
to the oil companies. Furthermore, the reopening of SPDC’s operations in Ogoniland has the 
potential of sparking protest. Nevertheless, such protests are unlikely to be as extensive as 
they have in the past unless there is a dramatic increase in oil prices raising the stakes. 
 
As a result for the next five years we estimate a probability of 
protests/demonstrations/blockades at 66%-95% causing medium impact, but may somewhat 
increase in impact with particularly high oil prices. 
 
5) Political and legal campaigning:  
With Ijaws in government position, major human-rights abuses against Ijaw communities 
with potential to defame SPDC are unlikely. However, the reactivation of SPDC operations in 
Ogoniland is likely to spark Ogoni protest, but Jonathan is likely to make efforts to avoid 
unwanted media attention and do his best to curtail military/police aggression. Even if 
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security forces would react violently, SPDC efforts at implementing the VPSHR is likely to 
insulate them from reputational/legal harmful criticism. 
 
As a result for the next five years we estimate a probability of harmful political and legal 
campaigning at 66%-95% causing low impact harm. 
 
   Figure 12: Conflict risk-matrix of SPDC’s       Figure 13: Conflict risk-matrix of SPDC’s  
   operations in the Niger-Delta 2012 – 2013       operations in the Niger-Delta 2014 – 2015 
 
8.4 Forecasting Conflict Risk to E&P Operations 
Exploring how we can best analyse political risk to E&P operations in areas of armed conflict 
we have found that by developing causal sequences we were able to link specific risk-events 
to their related risk-actors and risk-factors, and what risk management strategy the affected 
company have used. 
 
We also found that on the basis of our causal analysis we were able to construct three risk 
indicators that provide data on the exposure to risk. We found that elections, oil prices, and 
ethnic patronage are pertinent risk indicators of conflict risk to E&P operations, as they 
correlate and are causally linked to the risk-events.  
 
Finally, we were able to conduct a forecast on the future conflict risk to Shell’s E&P 
operations in the Niger-Delta. We found that until the pre-election and election years 
2014/2015, the most likely significant risk-event is from bunkering and piracy. However, the 
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years 2014/2015 will experience a shift in conflict risk as there will be a higher likelihood of 
risk-events such as targeting of energy-infrastructure and armed conflict, but a lower 
likelihood of bunkering and piracy. 
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9 Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to examine how we can best analyse political risk to E&P 
operations in areas of armed conflict. In this effort we used a case-study of the conflict risk to 
Shell’s E&P operations in the Niger-Delta to explicate on the larger class of political risk to 
E&P operations in areas of armed conflict. 
 
Analyzing political risk involves hypothesising on how the causal relationships between the 
analytical variables produce risk. To help organize our analytical variables and their 
relationships we created a causal model of political risk to E&P operations where the causal 
variables (risk-factors) influence the dependent variable (risk-events) through an intermediate 
variable (risk-actors) under the influence of an exogenous variable (risk management). The 
causal model was made operational by a political risk analysis (PRA) method.  
 
After exploring the different methods for analyzing political risk, we found that the ‘step-
based’ method best served our purpose doing an industry-specific micro-risk analysis of E&P 
operations. As the ‘step-based’ method provides individual steps for identifying and exploring 
each variable, it is well suited for making the causal model operational and facilitates analysis 
of the causal relationships between the variables. 
 
By providing an initial analysis of the assets at risk, we were able to tailor the political risk 
analysis to our particular focus on the E&P sector. It also provided us with the parameters 
necessary to be able to identify the particular risk-events. By limiting the analysis to conflict 
risk as a sub-category of political risk, we were able to identify and maintain focus on the 
most relevant risk-events to E&P operations in areas of armed conflict. By identifying this set 
of risk-events we were able to clearly define a dependent variable which allowed for further 
analysis of the variables in the causal model. 
 
This facilitated the identification of relevant risk-actors, which provided our analysis with the 
intermediate variable between the causal and the dependent variables, and allowed us to 
interlink particular risk-events to the risk-factors. By analyzing the risk-factors in terms of a 
causal variable representing the actors’ choices and a causal variable representing the 
structural environment they’re operating within, we were able to examine the conflict risk-
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events both as the outcome of the actors’ strategies and as the product of the structural 
characteristics of their environment. By integrating risk management into the analysis as an 
exogenous variable, we could analyse how the risk affected companies can reciprocally 
influence the risk-events they are exposed to.  
 
On the basis of the analysis we were able to develop causal sequences on the relationships 
between the analytical variables. This allowed us to explain particular risk-events (dependent 
variable) as the causal product of specific risk-factors (causal variables) with the causal effect 
being transmitted through specific risk-actors (intervening variable), which resulted in 
particular risk management (PRM) strategies (exogenous variable) being utilized by the risk 
affected company. On the basis of our causal analysis we were also able to construct three 
risk indicators that provide data on the exposure of conflict risk to E&P operations. Finally, 
on the basis of the complete political risk analysis we were able to forecast future conflict risk 
by creating particular contingencies and assess their plausibility of emerging accordingly. 
 
Applying the method to our case of Shell’s E&P operations in the Niger-Delta, we found that 
Shell is particularly exposed due to its high visibility, thousands of personnel, and extensive 
infrastructure. They have been exposed to a range of conflict risk-events genrated by ethnic-
militias, ethnic-advocacy groups, cults, local communities/community-militias. These have 
targeted Shell and other oil companies as a way of gaining access to oil revenues and related 
benefits. Shell initially attempted to manage these risks by relying exclusively on government 
and community protection, but as such strategies were often counterproductive they have 
increasingly aimed at engaging stakeholders more productively.  
 
On the basis of our political risk analysis we developed causal sequences linking the risk-
events, to the risk-actors, risk-factors, and risk management of Shell’s operations in the Niger-
Delta. The analysis also allowed us to construct risk indicators, finding that government 
elections, oil prices, and ethnic patronage provide us with the most appropriate indicators for 
monitoring the exposure to conflict risk for E&P operations. On this basis we forecasted 
future conflict risk-events to Shell’s E&P operations in the Niger-Delta, finding that until 
2014/2015 the most likely significant risk-event is from bunkering and piracy, but will in the 
election years shift to a higher likelihood of risk-events such as the targeting of energy-
infrastructure and armed conflict, and a lower likelihood of bunkering and piracy. 
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In essence, we have used a case-study of Shell’s E&P operations in the Niger-Delta to explore 
how we best can analyse political risk to E&P operations in areas of armed conflict. In doing 
so, we have offered a methodological framework which has allowed us to analyse the 
variables involved in such political risk. As a result, we were able to offer hypothesis with a 
high degree of internal validity (certainty) and an in-depth analysis on causal mechanisms on 
conflict risk to Shell’s E&P operations in the Niger-Delta. However, our analysis is less able 
to offer any general conclusions and magnitude of causal effects for the larger class of similar 
units (i.e. conflict risk to E&P operations). Nevertheless, as we have based our premises on 
statistical data and theories specifically relating to the oil industry, we presume that our 
conclusions on the causal relationships between the variables are transferable to this larger 
class of units, but this remains to be tested. 
 
However, our study is able offer a political risk analysis (PRA) method well suited for 
analyzing the political risk to E&P operations in areas of armed conflict. This would prove 
beneficial to E&P companies operating in conflict areas, such as Shell and ExxonMobile in 
Iraq, Eni in Libya, Petronas in Sudan, ‘Chinese National Oil Company’ in Ethiopia, ‘Africa 
Oil’ in northern Somalia, BP in Colombia etc. As new oil reserves are increasingly discovered 
in countries in (or with the potential for) armed conflict, this study would accordingly provide 
a productive approach for E&P companies pursuing such operations. Although the causal 
variables may interact differently from our case of Shell in the Niger-Delta, our method 
enables the identification of variables that inevitably must be present (risk-events will not 
materialize without risk-actors and risk-factors), and provide a method for analyzing theses 
variables. Academically, our causal analysis of the armed conflict in the Niger-Delta could 
prove a fruitful basis for further research on the relationships between oil production and 
armed conflict, as well as on management strategies for E&P companies operating in such 
areas.  
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